Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Incomplete contracts, ownership rights, and the optimality of equity joint ventures
AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto
AU - Tao, Zhigang
PY - 1998/12/30
Y1 - 1998/12/30
N2 - Firms engaged in the pooling of complementary skills often choose the Equity Joint Venture (EJV) over alternative profit-sharing arrangements. This paper addresses the issue of how equity shares are different from profit shares. It is shown that, in settings of contractual incompleteness, marketable equity ownership, when compared to non-transferable profit-sharing contracts, provides better ex ante incentives to the parties involved by mitigating ex post hold-up problems. Among other things, the prevalence of the 51–49 or 50–50 EJV in which one party has 51 percent (or 50 percent) equity shares is explained.
AB - Firms engaged in the pooling of complementary skills often choose the Equity Joint Venture (EJV) over alternative profit-sharing arrangements. This paper addresses the issue of how equity shares are different from profit shares. It is shown that, in settings of contractual incompleteness, marketable equity ownership, when compared to non-transferable profit-sharing contracts, provides better ex ante incentives to the parties involved by mitigating ex post hold-up problems. Among other things, the prevalence of the 51–49 or 50–50 EJV in which one party has 51 percent (or 50 percent) equity shares is explained.
KW - Incomplete contracts
KW - Equity shares
KW - Profit-sharing contracts
KW - Equity joint ventures
KW - Wholly-owned subsidiaries
U2 - 10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00117-6
DO - 10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00117-6
M3 - Journal article
VL - 37
SP - 391
EP - 413
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
IS - 4
ER -