Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Incumbency and Distributive Politics
T2 - Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico
AU - Abbott, Andrew James
AU - Cabral, René
AU - Jones, Philip
PY - 2017/10/31
Y1 - 2017/10/31
N2 - In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.
AB - In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.
U2 - 10.1002/soej.12226
DO - 10.1002/soej.12226
M3 - Journal article
VL - 84
SP - 484
EP - 503
JO - Southern Economic Journal
JF - Southern Economic Journal
SN - 0038-4038
IS - 2
ER -