Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment
AU - Pope, P F
AU - Peel, David
PY - 1997/10
Y1 - 1997/10
N2 - In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.
AB - In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.
KW - wage bargainin
KW - employee disclosure
U2 - 10.1111/1468-5957.t01-1-00172
DO - 10.1111/1468-5957.t01-1-00172
M3 - Journal article
VL - 24
SP - 1433
EP - 1435
JO - Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
JF - Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
SN - 1468-5957
IS - 9
ER -