Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 111, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.01.003
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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Input-trade Liberalization and the Demand for Managers
T2 - Evidence from India
AU - Chakraborty, Pavel
AU - Raveh, Ohad
N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 111, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.01.003
PY - 2018/3
Y1 - 2018/3
N2 - Can input-trade liberalization increase the demand for managers? Imported inputs are animportant source of technology ináows. Previous research on the implications of imported inputsoverlooked their potential e§ect on the demand for managing the new incoming knowledge.Adopting the case of India, this paper presents a Örst empirical attempt to Öll this gap. Usingdetailed Örm-level data that uniquely distinguishes between the compensations of managersand non-managers, and exploiting the exogenous nature of Indiaís Eight-Plan trade reform,we investigate the potential causal link between input-trade liberalization and the demand formanagers relative to non-managers. We Önd that a decrease in input tari§s increases the relativedemand for managers, primarily in domestic Örms that use the imported inputs to produceintermediate goods. SpeciÖcally, a 10% drop in input tari§s induces, on average, a 1-1.5%increase in the compensation share of managers, manifested via increases in both their numberas well as average wages and bonuses. These patterns are: (i) observed across the Örmsí sizedistribution; (ii) applicable for both exporting and non-exporting Örms; (iii) stronger in familyrunÖrms that operate under áexible labor market regulations; (iv) relatively more dominantin the short-run. In addition, we show that unlike changes in input tari§s, import competitiondoes not a§ect the relative demand for managers.
AB - Can input-trade liberalization increase the demand for managers? Imported inputs are animportant source of technology ináows. Previous research on the implications of imported inputsoverlooked their potential e§ect on the demand for managing the new incoming knowledge.Adopting the case of India, this paper presents a Örst empirical attempt to Öll this gap. Usingdetailed Örm-level data that uniquely distinguishes between the compensations of managersand non-managers, and exploiting the exogenous nature of Indiaís Eight-Plan trade reform,we investigate the potential causal link between input-trade liberalization and the demand formanagers relative to non-managers. We Önd that a decrease in input tari§s increases the relativedemand for managers, primarily in domestic Örms that use the imported inputs to produceintermediate goods. SpeciÖcally, a 10% drop in input tari§s induces, on average, a 1-1.5%increase in the compensation share of managers, manifested via increases in both their numberas well as average wages and bonuses. These patterns are: (i) observed across the Örmsí sizedistribution; (ii) applicable for both exporting and non-exporting Örms; (iii) stronger in familyrunÖrms that operate under áexible labor market regulations; (iv) relatively more dominantin the short-run. In addition, we show that unlike changes in input tari§s, import competitiondoes not a§ect the relative demand for managers.
KW - Input-trade liberalization
KW - input tariffs
KW - demand for managers
KW - firm organization
U2 - 10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.01.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.01.003
M3 - Journal article
VL - 111
SP - 159
EP - 176
JO - Journal of International Economics
JF - Journal of International Economics
SN - 0022-1996
ER -