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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Campbell, D. (2015) Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy. Leg Stud (Soc Leg Scholars), 35: 430–442. doi: 10.1111/lest.12071. which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lest.12071/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy. / Campbell, David.

In: Legal Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, 09.2015, p. 430-442.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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@article{13d3265dd6e0461dbd72d12231c11960,
title = "Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy",
abstract = "Adapting the concept of ‘interpersonal justice’ used by Professor Robertson to provide a ‘meta-doctrinal’ defence of the law of negligence, this article asks whether the personal injury system can be thought to have a democratic justification in common beliefs in such justice. It is widely acknowledged that the gross functional inadequacy of the personal injury system makes it implausible to claim that that system can be justified on grounds of compensation or deterrence. But that inadequacy makes it equally implausible to claim that common citizens would chose that system, which exists only because it is effectively compulsory. Constructing a market in first person insurance would put the existence of the personal injury system to the test of actual choice.",
author = "David Campbell",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Campbell, D. (2015) Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy. Leg Stud (Soc Leg Scholars), 35: 430–442. doi: 10.1111/lest.12071. which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lest.12071/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.",
year = "2015",
month = "9",
doi = "10.1111/lest.12071",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "430--442",
journal = "Legal Studies",
issn = "0261-3875",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy

AU - Campbell, David

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Campbell, D. (2015) Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy. Leg Stud (Soc Leg Scholars), 35: 430–442. doi: 10.1111/lest.12071. which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lest.12071/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2015/9

Y1 - 2015/9

N2 - Adapting the concept of ‘interpersonal justice’ used by Professor Robertson to provide a ‘meta-doctrinal’ defence of the law of negligence, this article asks whether the personal injury system can be thought to have a democratic justification in common beliefs in such justice. It is widely acknowledged that the gross functional inadequacy of the personal injury system makes it implausible to claim that that system can be justified on grounds of compensation or deterrence. But that inadequacy makes it equally implausible to claim that common citizens would chose that system, which exists only because it is effectively compulsory. Constructing a market in first person insurance would put the existence of the personal injury system to the test of actual choice.

AB - Adapting the concept of ‘interpersonal justice’ used by Professor Robertson to provide a ‘meta-doctrinal’ defence of the law of negligence, this article asks whether the personal injury system can be thought to have a democratic justification in common beliefs in such justice. It is widely acknowledged that the gross functional inadequacy of the personal injury system makes it implausible to claim that that system can be justified on grounds of compensation or deterrence. But that inadequacy makes it equally implausible to claim that common citizens would chose that system, which exists only because it is effectively compulsory. Constructing a market in first person insurance would put the existence of the personal injury system to the test of actual choice.

U2 - 10.1111/lest.12071

DO - 10.1111/lest.12071

M3 - Journal article

VL - 35

SP - 430

EP - 442

JO - Legal Studies

JF - Legal Studies

SN - 0261-3875

IS - 3

ER -