Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Campbell, D. (2015) Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy. Leg Stud (Soc Leg Scholars), 35: 430–442. doi: 10.1111/lest.12071. which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lest.12071/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy
AU - Campbell, David
N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Campbell, D. (2015) Interpersonal justice and actual choice as ways of determining personal injury law and policy. Leg Stud (Soc Leg Scholars), 35: 430–442. doi: 10.1111/lest.12071. which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lest.12071/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
PY - 2015/9
Y1 - 2015/9
N2 - Adapting the concept of ‘interpersonal justice’ used by Professor Robertson to provide a ‘meta-doctrinal’ defence of the law of negligence, this article asks whether the personal injury system can be thought to have a democratic justification in common beliefs in such justice. It is widely acknowledged that the gross functional inadequacy of the personal injury system makes it implausible to claim that that system can be justified on grounds of compensation or deterrence. But that inadequacy makes it equally implausible to claim that common citizens would chose that system, which exists only because it is effectively compulsory. Constructing a market in first person insurance would put the existence of the personal injury system to the test of actual choice.
AB - Adapting the concept of ‘interpersonal justice’ used by Professor Robertson to provide a ‘meta-doctrinal’ defence of the law of negligence, this article asks whether the personal injury system can be thought to have a democratic justification in common beliefs in such justice. It is widely acknowledged that the gross functional inadequacy of the personal injury system makes it implausible to claim that that system can be justified on grounds of compensation or deterrence. But that inadequacy makes it equally implausible to claim that common citizens would chose that system, which exists only because it is effectively compulsory. Constructing a market in first person insurance would put the existence of the personal injury system to the test of actual choice.
U2 - 10.1111/lest.12071
DO - 10.1111/lest.12071
M3 - Journal article
VL - 35
SP - 430
EP - 442
JO - Legal Studies
JF - Legal Studies
SN - 0261-3875
IS - 3
ER -