Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Judges in our own case

Research

Associated organisational unit

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

Judges in our own case: Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

Judges in our own case: Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution. / Williams, Garrath.
In: Journal of International Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2007, p. 8-23.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Williams, G 2007, 'Judges in our own case: Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution', Journal of International Political Theory, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 8-23. https://doi.org/10.3366/per.2007.3.1.8

APA

Williams, G. (2007). Judges in our own case: Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution. Journal of International Political Theory, 3(1), 8-23. https://doi.org/10.3366/per.2007.3.1.8

Vancouver

Williams G. Judges in our own case: Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution. Journal of International Political Theory. 2007;3(1):8-23. doi: 10.3366/per.2007.3.1.8

Author

Williams, Garrath. / Judges in our own case : Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution. In: Journal of International Political Theory. 2007 ; Vol. 3, No. 1. pp. 8-23.

Bibtex

@article{bdadfbd960124ad49fac13b1dfbd8fc2,
title = "Judges in our own case: Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution",
abstract = "This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges {\textquoteleft}in our own case{\textquoteright}, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice.",
keywords = "Co-legislation, constructivism , Kant , maxim , moral judgment , respect , responsibility , responsibility attribution , wrongdoing",
author = "Garrath Williams",
year = "2007",
doi = "10.3366/per.2007.3.1.8",
language = "English",
volume = "3",
pages = "8--23",
journal = "Journal of International Political Theory",
issn = "1755-0882",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Judges in our own case

T2 - Kantian legislation and responsibility attribution

AU - Williams, Garrath

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges ‘in our own case’, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice.

AB - This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges ‘in our own case’, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice.

KW - Co-legislation

KW - constructivism

KW - Kant

KW - maxim

KW - moral judgment

KW - respect

KW - responsibility

KW - responsibility attribution

KW - wrongdoing

U2 - 10.3366/per.2007.3.1.8

DO - 10.3366/per.2007.3.1.8

M3 - Journal article

VL - 3

SP - 8

EP - 23

JO - Journal of International Political Theory

JF - Journal of International Political Theory

SN - 1755-0882

IS - 1

ER -