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  • Malice CLJ final

    Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, The Cambridge Law Journal, 78 (2), pp355-382 2019, © 2019 Cambridge University Press

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Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1/07/2019
<mark>Journal</mark>The Cambridge Law Journal
Issue number2
Volume78
Number of pages28
Pages (from-to)355-382
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date10/05/19
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

This article is concerned with the question of whether malice is an appropriate touchstone of liability in tort law. It begins by identifying four torts in which malice may properly be regarded as an ingredient of liability (distinguishing various other torts, such as private nuisance and defamation, in which malice plays a merely secondary and contingent role). Having identified these four torts – namely malicious prosecution, abuse of process, misfeasance in a public office and lawful means conspiracy – the article then seeks to identify a common juridical thread which links them together. So doing serves to rebut the allegation, often made in respect of all them, namely, that they are anomalous actions. It then concludes by considering the individual worth of these torts, bearing in mind the important difference between not being anomalous on the one hand, and being positively meritorious on the other. It concludes that a respectable defence of each of the four torts can be made even though malice is an atypical touchstone of liability.

Bibliographic note

The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, The Cambridge Law Journal, 78 (2), pp355-382 2019, © 2019 Cambridge University Press