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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Corporate Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 48, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.001

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Managerial incentives and strategic choices of firms with different ownership structures

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Managerial incentives and strategic choices of firms with different ownership structures. / Banerjee, Shantanu; Homroy, Swarnodeep.

In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 48, 02.2018, p. 314-330.

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@article{38665adb826843e39466df9e7e16425a,
title = "Managerial incentives and strategic choices of firms with different ownership structures",
abstract = "We examine how ownership structure affects managerial incentive alignment mechanisms and strategic objectives. We compare large Indian firms with dispersed equity ownership with business-group affiliates operating within the same institutional frameworks. We find that the performance sensitivity of CEO pay and turnover differ significantly across group affiliates and stand-alone firms. The strategic choices of firms also differ in response to managerial incentives. However, we find that, regardless of those differences, firm performance is similar for both types of firms. Overall, this paper suggests that ownership structure and managerial incentives can adjust to optimize strategic choices and firm performance.",
keywords = "Corporate Governance, Controlling Shareholders, Firm Performance, Strategic Choices, India",
author = "Shantanu Banerjee and Swarnodeep Homroy",
note = "This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Corporate Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 48, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.001",
year = "2018",
month = "2",
doi = "10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.001",
language = "English",
volume = "48",
pages = "314--330",
journal = "Journal of Corporate Finance",
issn = "0929-1199",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Managerial incentives and strategic choices of firms with different ownership structures

AU - Banerjee, Shantanu

AU - Homroy, Swarnodeep

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Corporate Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Corporate Finance, 48, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.001

PY - 2018/2

Y1 - 2018/2

N2 - We examine how ownership structure affects managerial incentive alignment mechanisms and strategic objectives. We compare large Indian firms with dispersed equity ownership with business-group affiliates operating within the same institutional frameworks. We find that the performance sensitivity of CEO pay and turnover differ significantly across group affiliates and stand-alone firms. The strategic choices of firms also differ in response to managerial incentives. However, we find that, regardless of those differences, firm performance is similar for both types of firms. Overall, this paper suggests that ownership structure and managerial incentives can adjust to optimize strategic choices and firm performance.

AB - We examine how ownership structure affects managerial incentive alignment mechanisms and strategic objectives. We compare large Indian firms with dispersed equity ownership with business-group affiliates operating within the same institutional frameworks. We find that the performance sensitivity of CEO pay and turnover differ significantly across group affiliates and stand-alone firms. The strategic choices of firms also differ in response to managerial incentives. However, we find that, regardless of those differences, firm performance is similar for both types of firms. Overall, this paper suggests that ownership structure and managerial incentives can adjust to optimize strategic choices and firm performance.

KW - Corporate Governance

KW - Controlling Shareholders

KW - Firm Performance

KW - Strategic Choices

KW - India

U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 48

SP - 314

EP - 330

JO - Journal of Corporate Finance

JF - Journal of Corporate Finance

SN - 0929-1199

ER -