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    Rights statement: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quartley following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Christopher Macleod Mill's Antirealism The Philosophical Quarterly 2016 66: 261-279 is available online at: http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/content/66/263/261

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Mill's Antirealism

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Mill's Antirealism. / Macleod, Christopher.

In: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 263, 04.2016, p. 261-279.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Macleod, C 2016, 'Mill's Antirealism', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 66, no. 263, pp. 261-279. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv072

APA

Macleod, C. (2016). Mill's Antirealism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(263), 261-279. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv072

Vancouver

Macleod C. Mill's Antirealism. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2016 Apr;66(263):261-279. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv072

Author

Macleod, Christopher. / Mill's Antirealism. In: The Philosophical Quarterly. 2016 ; Vol. 66, No. 263. pp. 261-279.

Bibtex

@article{dd20251a705c4d0c8d46d4e1643daae6,
title = "Mill's Antirealism",
abstract = "One of Mill’s primary targets, throughout his work, is intuitionism. In this paper, I distinguish two strands of intuitionism, against which Mill offers separate arguments. The first strand, ‘a priorism’ makes an epistemic claim about how we come to know norms. The second strand, ‘first principle pluralism’, makes a structural claim about how many fundamental norms there are. In this paper, I suggest that one natural reading of Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is incompatible with the naturalism that drives his argument against a priorism. It must, therefore, be discarded. Such a reading, however, covertly attributes Mill realist commitments about the normative. These commitments are unnecessary. To the extent that Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is taken seriously, I suggest, it is an argument that points towards Mill as having an antirealist approach to the normative.",
keywords = "John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism, metaethics, realism, antirealism",
author = "Christopher Macleod",
note = "This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quartley following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Christopher Macleod Mill's Antirealism The Philosophical Quarterly 2016 66: 261-279 is available online at: http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/content/66/263/261",
year = "2016",
month = "4",
doi = "10.1093/pq/pqv072",
language = "English",
volume = "66",
pages = "261--279",
journal = "The Philosophical Quarterly",
issn = "0031-8094",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "263",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mill's Antirealism

AU - Macleod, Christopher

N1 - This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quartley following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Christopher Macleod Mill's Antirealism The Philosophical Quarterly 2016 66: 261-279 is available online at: http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/content/66/263/261

PY - 2016/4

Y1 - 2016/4

N2 - One of Mill’s primary targets, throughout his work, is intuitionism. In this paper, I distinguish two strands of intuitionism, against which Mill offers separate arguments. The first strand, ‘a priorism’ makes an epistemic claim about how we come to know norms. The second strand, ‘first principle pluralism’, makes a structural claim about how many fundamental norms there are. In this paper, I suggest that one natural reading of Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is incompatible with the naturalism that drives his argument against a priorism. It must, therefore, be discarded. Such a reading, however, covertly attributes Mill realist commitments about the normative. These commitments are unnecessary. To the extent that Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is taken seriously, I suggest, it is an argument that points towards Mill as having an antirealist approach to the normative.

AB - One of Mill’s primary targets, throughout his work, is intuitionism. In this paper, I distinguish two strands of intuitionism, against which Mill offers separate arguments. The first strand, ‘a priorism’ makes an epistemic claim about how we come to know norms. The second strand, ‘first principle pluralism’, makes a structural claim about how many fundamental norms there are. In this paper, I suggest that one natural reading of Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is incompatible with the naturalism that drives his argument against a priorism. It must, therefore, be discarded. Such a reading, however, covertly attributes Mill realist commitments about the normative. These commitments are unnecessary. To the extent that Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is taken seriously, I suggest, it is an argument that points towards Mill as having an antirealist approach to the normative.

KW - John Stuart Mill

KW - utilitarianism

KW - metaethics

KW - realism

KW - antirealism

U2 - 10.1093/pq/pqv072

DO - 10.1093/pq/pqv072

M3 - Journal article

VL - 66

SP - 261

EP - 279

JO - The Philosophical Quarterly

JF - The Philosophical Quarterly

SN - 0031-8094

IS - 263

ER -