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Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC: a case of ecological fallacy?

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Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC : a case of ecological fallacy? / Maystadt, Jean-Francois; De Luca, Giacomo; Sekeris, Petros; Ulimwengu, John.

In: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 66, No. 3, 2014, p. 721-749.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Maystadt, J-F, De Luca, G, Sekeris, P & Ulimwengu, J 2014, 'Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC: a case of ecological fallacy?', Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 721-749. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpt037

APA

Maystadt, J-F., De Luca, G., Sekeris, P., & Ulimwengu, J. (2014). Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC: a case of ecological fallacy? Oxford Economic Papers, 66(3), 721-749. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpt037

Vancouver

Maystadt J-F, De Luca G, Sekeris P, Ulimwengu J. Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC: a case of ecological fallacy? Oxford Economic Papers. 2014;66(3):721-749. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpt037

Author

Maystadt, Jean-Francois ; De Luca, Giacomo ; Sekeris, Petros ; Ulimwengu, John. / Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC : a case of ecological fallacy?. In: Oxford Economic Papers. 2014 ; Vol. 66, No. 3. pp. 721-749.

Bibtex

@article{baf9d56a7da2489987accc3e04481155,
title = "Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC: a case of ecological fallacy?",
abstract = "We estimate the impact of geo-located mining concessions on the number of conflict events recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1997 and 2007. Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with changes in international prices of minerals, we unveil an ecological fallacy: Whereas concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), they do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We develop and validate empirically a theoretical model where the incentives of armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings.",
author = "Jean-Francois Maystadt and {De Luca}, Giacomo and Petros Sekeris and John Ulimwengu",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1093/oep/gpt037",
language = "English",
volume = "66",
pages = "721--749",
journal = "Oxford Economic Papers",
issn = "0030-7653",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mineral resources and conflicts in DRC

T2 - a case of ecological fallacy?

AU - Maystadt, Jean-Francois

AU - De Luca, Giacomo

AU - Sekeris, Petros

AU - Ulimwengu, John

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - We estimate the impact of geo-located mining concessions on the number of conflict events recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1997 and 2007. Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with changes in international prices of minerals, we unveil an ecological fallacy: Whereas concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), they do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We develop and validate empirically a theoretical model where the incentives of armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings.

AB - We estimate the impact of geo-located mining concessions on the number of conflict events recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1997 and 2007. Instrumenting the variable of interest with historical concessions interacted with changes in international prices of minerals, we unveil an ecological fallacy: Whereas concessions have no effect on the number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), they do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We develop and validate empirically a theoretical model where the incentives of armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical findings.

U2 - 10.1093/oep/gpt037

DO - 10.1093/oep/gpt037

M3 - Journal article

VL - 66

SP - 721

EP - 749

JO - Oxford Economic Papers

JF - Oxford Economic Papers

SN - 0030-7653

IS - 3

ER -