Submitted manuscript, 1.25 MB, PDF document
Research output: Working paper
Research output: Working paper
}
TY - UNPB
T1 - Monitoring matters
T2 - debt seniority, market discipline and bank conduct
AU - Danisewicz, Piotr
AU - McGowan, Danny
AU - Onali, Enrico
AU - Schaeck, Klaus
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - We examine if junior debtholders monitor banks and if such monitoring constrains risk-taking. Leveraging an unexplored natural experiment in the U.S. that changes the priority structure of claims on failed banks’ assets, we provide novel insights into the debate on market discipline. We document asymmetric effects for monitoring effort depending on whether a creditor class moves up or down the priority ladder. Conferring priority to all depositors causes declines in deposit interest rates but increases interest rates for non-deposit liabilities, suggesting greater incentives for junior debtholders to exert monitoring effort. Consistent with the idea that senior claims require lower risk premiums, banks increasingly rely on deposit funding following changes in priority structure. More intensive monitoring also influences conduct: subordinating non-depositor claims reduces risk taking. Our results inform the debate about bail-ins and highlight that changes in the priority structure are a complementary tool to regulation which has received little attention in prior work.
AB - We examine if junior debtholders monitor banks and if such monitoring constrains risk-taking. Leveraging an unexplored natural experiment in the U.S. that changes the priority structure of claims on failed banks’ assets, we provide novel insights into the debate on market discipline. We document asymmetric effects for monitoring effort depending on whether a creditor class moves up or down the priority ladder. Conferring priority to all depositors causes declines in deposit interest rates but increases interest rates for non-deposit liabilities, suggesting greater incentives for junior debtholders to exert monitoring effort. Consistent with the idea that senior claims require lower risk premiums, banks increasingly rely on deposit funding following changes in priority structure. More intensive monitoring also influences conduct: subordinating non-depositor claims reduces risk taking. Our results inform the debate about bail-ins and highlight that changes in the priority structure are a complementary tool to regulation which has received little attention in prior work.
M3 - Working paper
BT - Monitoring matters
ER -