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National or political cake?: the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria

Research output: Working paper

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National or political cake? the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria. / Maystadt, Jean-Francois; Salihu, Muhammad Kabir.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2015. (Economics working paper series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Maystadt, J-F & Salihu, MK 2015 'National or political cake? the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria' Economics working paper series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Maystadt, J-F., & Salihu, M. K. (2015). National or political cake? the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria. (Economics working paper series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Maystadt J-F, Salihu MK. National or political cake? the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2015 Dec. (Economics working paper series).

Author

Maystadt, Jean-Francois ; Salihu, Muhammad Kabir. / National or political cake? the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2015. (Economics working paper series).

Bibtex

@techreport{aa24924aee6c43b59ad5f2001a801878,
title = "National or political cake?: the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria",
abstract = "Analysing the effect of opportunistic fiscal transfers on the electoral fortune of incumbent politicians can be very difficult due to problems of endogeneity. In this paper, we use oil windfalls as an exogenous variation in the political discretion an incumbent government can exert in rule-based transfers. Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 in Nigeria, an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls is found to improve the electoral fortune of an incumbent government. Our results question the role of rule-based transfers as an efficient institutional arrangement in resource-abundant countries.",
keywords = "Intergovernmental transfers, ruled-based transfers, political manipulation, fiscal federalism, Nigeria",
author = "Jean-Francois Maystadt and Salihu, {Muhammad Kabir}",
year = "2015",
month = dec,
language = "English",
series = "Economics working paper series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - National or political cake?

T2 - the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria

AU - Maystadt, Jean-Francois

AU - Salihu, Muhammad Kabir

PY - 2015/12

Y1 - 2015/12

N2 - Analysing the effect of opportunistic fiscal transfers on the electoral fortune of incumbent politicians can be very difficult due to problems of endogeneity. In this paper, we use oil windfalls as an exogenous variation in the political discretion an incumbent government can exert in rule-based transfers. Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 in Nigeria, an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls is found to improve the electoral fortune of an incumbent government. Our results question the role of rule-based transfers as an efficient institutional arrangement in resource-abundant countries.

AB - Analysing the effect of opportunistic fiscal transfers on the electoral fortune of incumbent politicians can be very difficult due to problems of endogeneity. In this paper, we use oil windfalls as an exogenous variation in the political discretion an incumbent government can exert in rule-based transfers. Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 in Nigeria, an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls is found to improve the electoral fortune of an incumbent government. Our results question the role of rule-based transfers as an efficient institutional arrangement in resource-abundant countries.

KW - Intergovernmental transfers

KW - ruled-based transfers

KW - political manipulation

KW - fiscal federalism

KW - Nigeria

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics working paper series

BT - National or political cake?

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -