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On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness.

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On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness. / Introna, Lucas; Ilharco, F.
In: Human Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, 01.2006, p. 57-76.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Introna, L & Ilharco, F 2006, 'On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness.', Human Studies, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 57-76. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-005-9009-y

APA

Introna, L., & Ilharco, F. (2006). On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness. Human Studies, 29(1), 57-76. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-005-9009-y

Vancouver

Introna L, Ilharco F. On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness. Human Studies. 2006 Jan;29(1):57-76. doi: 10.1007/s10746-005-9009-y

Author

Introna, Lucas ; Ilharco, F. / On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness. In: Human Studies. 2006 ; Vol. 29, No. 1. pp. 57-76.

Bibtex

@article{41851fc7eb02452eb08767dbb22dda35,
title = "On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness.",
abstract = "This paper presents a Heideggerian phenomenological analysis of screens. In a world and an epoch where screens pervade a great many aspects of human experience, we submit that phenomenology, much in a traditional methodological form, can provide an interesting and novel basis for our understanding of screens. We ground our analysis in the ontology of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time [1927/1962], claiming that screens will only show themselves as they are if taken as screens-in-the-world. Thus, the phenomenon of screen is not investigated in its empirical form or conceptually. It is rather taken as a grounding intentional orientation that conditions our engagement with certain surfaces as we comport ourselves towards them {\^a}��as screens.{\^a}�� In doing this we claim to have opened up the phenomenon of screen in a new and meaningful way.",
keywords = "communication - computer - Heidegger - information systems - information technology - media - phenomenology - screens - television",
author = "Lucas Introna and F Ilharco",
year = "2006",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1007/s10746-005-9009-y",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "57--76",
journal = "Human Studies",
issn = "0163-8548",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness.

AU - Introna, Lucas

AU - Ilharco, F

PY - 2006/1

Y1 - 2006/1

N2 - This paper presents a Heideggerian phenomenological analysis of screens. In a world and an epoch where screens pervade a great many aspects of human experience, we submit that phenomenology, much in a traditional methodological form, can provide an interesting and novel basis for our understanding of screens. We ground our analysis in the ontology of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time [1927/1962], claiming that screens will only show themselves as they are if taken as screens-in-the-world. Thus, the phenomenon of screen is not investigated in its empirical form or conceptually. It is rather taken as a grounding intentional orientation that conditions our engagement with certain surfaces as we comport ourselves towards them �as screens.� In doing this we claim to have opened up the phenomenon of screen in a new and meaningful way.

AB - This paper presents a Heideggerian phenomenological analysis of screens. In a world and an epoch where screens pervade a great many aspects of human experience, we submit that phenomenology, much in a traditional methodological form, can provide an interesting and novel basis for our understanding of screens. We ground our analysis in the ontology of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time [1927/1962], claiming that screens will only show themselves as they are if taken as screens-in-the-world. Thus, the phenomenon of screen is not investigated in its empirical form or conceptually. It is rather taken as a grounding intentional orientation that conditions our engagement with certain surfaces as we comport ourselves towards them �as screens.� In doing this we claim to have opened up the phenomenon of screen in a new and meaningful way.

KW - communication - computer - Heidegger - information systems - information technology - media - phenomenology - screens - television

U2 - 10.1007/s10746-005-9009-y

DO - 10.1007/s10746-005-9009-y

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 57

EP - 76

JO - Human Studies

JF - Human Studies

SN - 0163-8548

IS - 1

ER -