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On the security of machine learning in malware C & C detection: a survey

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On the security of machine learning in malware C & C detection: a survey. / Gardiner, Joseph; Nagaraja, Shishir.
In: ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 49, No. 3, 59, 18.12.2016.

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Gardiner J, Nagaraja S. On the security of machine learning in malware C & C detection: a survey. ACM Computing Surveys. 2016 Dec 18;49(3):59. doi: 10.1145/3003816

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@article{ec764b78c92a4964a3feb458a0dd30ca,
title = "On the security of machine learning in malware C & C detection: a survey",
abstract = "One of the main challenges in security today is defending against malware attacks. As trends and anecdotal evidence show, preventing these attacks, regardless of their indiscriminate or targeted nature, has proven difficult: intrusions happen and devices get compromised, even at security-conscious organizations. As a consequence, an alternative line of work has focused on detecting and disrupting the individual steps that follow an initial compromise and are essential for the successful progression of the attack. In particular, several approaches and techniques have been proposed to identify the command and control (C&C) channel that a compromised system establishes to communicate with its controller. A major oversight of many of these detection techniques is the design's resilience to evasion attempts by the well-motivated attacker. C&C detection techniques make widespread use of a machine learning (ML) component. Therefore, to analyze the evasion resilience of these detection techniques, we first systematize works in the field of C&C detection and then, using existing models from the literature, go on to systematize attacks against the ML components used in these approaches.",
author = "Joseph Gardiner and Shishir Nagaraja",
year = "2016",
month = dec,
day = "18",
doi = "10.1145/3003816",
language = "English",
volume = "49",
journal = "ACM Computing Surveys",
issn = "0360-0300",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - On the security of machine learning in malware C & C detection

T2 - a survey

AU - Gardiner, Joseph

AU - Nagaraja, Shishir

PY - 2016/12/18

Y1 - 2016/12/18

N2 - One of the main challenges in security today is defending against malware attacks. As trends and anecdotal evidence show, preventing these attacks, regardless of their indiscriminate or targeted nature, has proven difficult: intrusions happen and devices get compromised, even at security-conscious organizations. As a consequence, an alternative line of work has focused on detecting and disrupting the individual steps that follow an initial compromise and are essential for the successful progression of the attack. In particular, several approaches and techniques have been proposed to identify the command and control (C&C) channel that a compromised system establishes to communicate with its controller. A major oversight of many of these detection techniques is the design's resilience to evasion attempts by the well-motivated attacker. C&C detection techniques make widespread use of a machine learning (ML) component. Therefore, to analyze the evasion resilience of these detection techniques, we first systematize works in the field of C&C detection and then, using existing models from the literature, go on to systematize attacks against the ML components used in these approaches.

AB - One of the main challenges in security today is defending against malware attacks. As trends and anecdotal evidence show, preventing these attacks, regardless of their indiscriminate or targeted nature, has proven difficult: intrusions happen and devices get compromised, even at security-conscious organizations. As a consequence, an alternative line of work has focused on detecting and disrupting the individual steps that follow an initial compromise and are essential for the successful progression of the attack. In particular, several approaches and techniques have been proposed to identify the command and control (C&C) channel that a compromised system establishes to communicate with its controller. A major oversight of many of these detection techniques is the design's resilience to evasion attempts by the well-motivated attacker. C&C detection techniques make widespread use of a machine learning (ML) component. Therefore, to analyze the evasion resilience of these detection techniques, we first systematize works in the field of C&C detection and then, using existing models from the literature, go on to systematize attacks against the ML components used in these approaches.

U2 - 10.1145/3003816

DO - 10.1145/3003816

M3 - Journal article

VL - 49

JO - ACM Computing Surveys

JF - ACM Computing Surveys

SN - 0360-0300

IS - 3

M1 - 59

ER -