Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: MOTTA, G. and ROSSI, R. (2018), Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. . doi:10.1111/jmcb.12544 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jmcb.12544/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation
AU - Motta, Giorgio Enrico
AU - Rossi, Raffaele
N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: MOTTA, G. and ROSSI, R. (2018), Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. . doi:10.1111/jmcb.12544 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jmcb.12544/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
PY - 2019/2
Y1 - 2019/2
N2 - We characterise optimal fiscal policies in a General Equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labour income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of prots (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policy-maker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labour income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the US economy.
AB - We characterise optimal fiscal policies in a General Equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labour income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of prots (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policy-maker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labour income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the US economy.
KW - Fiscal policy
KW - consumption taxation
KW - endogenous government spending
U2 - 10.1111/jmcb.12544
DO - 10.1111/jmcb.12544
M3 - Journal article
VL - 51
SP - 139
EP - 161
JO - Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
JF - Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
SN - 0022-2879
IS - 1
ER -