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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: MOTTA, G. and ROSSI, R. (2018), Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. . doi:10.1111/jmcb.12544 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jmcb.12544/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published

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Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. / Motta, Giorgio Enrico; Rossi, Raffaele.

In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 51, No. 1, 02.2019, p. 139-161.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Motta, GE & Rossi, R 2019, 'Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 139-161. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12544

APA

Motta, G. E., & Rossi, R. (2019). Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 51(1), 139-161. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12544

Vancouver

Motta GE, Rossi R. Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 2019 Feb;51(1):139-161. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12544

Author

Motta, Giorgio Enrico ; Rossi, Raffaele. / Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 2019 ; Vol. 51, No. 1. pp. 139-161.

Bibtex

@article{f46604f1dda14cdbb91ad483de8c1a2e,
title = "Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation",
abstract = "We characterise optimal fiscal policies in a General Equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labour income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of prots (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policy-maker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labour income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the US economy.",
keywords = "Fiscal policy , consumption taxation, endogenous government spending",
author = "Motta, {Giorgio Enrico} and Raffaele Rossi",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: MOTTA, G. and ROSSI, R. (2018), Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. . doi:10.1111/jmcb.12544 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jmcb.12544/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.",
year = "2019",
month = "2",
doi = "10.1111/jmcb.12544",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "139--161",
journal = "Journal of Money, Credit and Banking",
issn = "0022-2879",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

AU - Motta, Giorgio Enrico

AU - Rossi, Raffaele

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: MOTTA, G. and ROSSI, R. (2018), Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. . doi:10.1111/jmcb.12544 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jmcb.12544/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2019/2

Y1 - 2019/2

N2 - We characterise optimal fiscal policies in a General Equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labour income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of prots (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policy-maker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labour income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the US economy.

AB - We characterise optimal fiscal policies in a General Equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labour income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of prots (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policy-maker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labour income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the US economy.

KW - Fiscal policy

KW - consumption taxation

KW - endogenous government spending

U2 - 10.1111/jmcb.12544

DO - 10.1111/jmcb.12544

M3 - Journal article

VL - 51

SP - 139

EP - 161

JO - Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

JF - Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

SN - 0022-2879

IS - 1

ER -