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Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues

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Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues. / Dasgupta, Sudipto; Sengupta, Kunal.
In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 58, No. 2, 02.1995, p. 215-234.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Dasgupta, S & Sengupta, K 1995, 'Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 215-234. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)01474-3

APA

Dasgupta, S., & Sengupta, K. (1995). Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues. Journal of Public Economics, 58(2), 215-234. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)01474-3

Vancouver

Dasgupta S, Sengupta K. Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues. Journal of Public Economics. 1995 Feb;58(2):215-234. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01474-3

Author

Dasgupta, Sudipto ; Sengupta, Kunal. / Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues. In: Journal of Public Economics. 1995 ; Vol. 58, No. 2. pp. 215-234.

Bibtex

@article{a47a624c2c0244bc81e37f3a3b118ca8,
title = "Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues",
abstract = "The paper analyses the optimal regulation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) by a host government interested in maximizing tax revenues, when the MNE has private information about its benefits of controlling the enterprise. It is shown that the optimal mechanism involves restricting the MNEs ownership of the enterprise, and setting a ceiling on the transfer price of an input that the MNE provides that is above the known production cost of the input. For low realizations of the benefits of control, the MNE transfers control to a domestic partner, while for high realizations, it retains control.",
keywords = "Multinationals, Regulation, Asymmetric information, Ownership, Transfer pricing",
author = "Sudipto Dasgupta and Kunal Sengupta",
year = "1995",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1016/0047-2727(94)01474-3",
language = "English",
volume = "58",
pages = "215--234",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal regulation of MNEs and government revenues

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

AU - Sengupta, Kunal

PY - 1995/2

Y1 - 1995/2

N2 - The paper analyses the optimal regulation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) by a host government interested in maximizing tax revenues, when the MNE has private information about its benefits of controlling the enterprise. It is shown that the optimal mechanism involves restricting the MNEs ownership of the enterprise, and setting a ceiling on the transfer price of an input that the MNE provides that is above the known production cost of the input. For low realizations of the benefits of control, the MNE transfers control to a domestic partner, while for high realizations, it retains control.

AB - The paper analyses the optimal regulation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) by a host government interested in maximizing tax revenues, when the MNE has private information about its benefits of controlling the enterprise. It is shown that the optimal mechanism involves restricting the MNEs ownership of the enterprise, and setting a ceiling on the transfer price of an input that the MNE provides that is above the known production cost of the input. For low realizations of the benefits of control, the MNE transfers control to a domestic partner, while for high realizations, it retains control.

KW - Multinationals

KW - Regulation

KW - Asymmetric information

KW - Ownership

KW - Transfer pricing

U2 - 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01474-3

DO - 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01474-3

M3 - Journal article

VL - 58

SP - 215

EP - 234

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 2

ER -