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PASS: An Address Space Slicing Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paper

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PASS : An Address Space Slicing Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation. / Germanus, D.; Ismail, H.; Suri, Neeraj.

2015 IEEE 34th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS). IEEE, 2015. p. 74-83.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paper

Harvard

Germanus, D, Ismail, H & Suri, N 2015, PASS: An Address Space Slicing Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation. in 2015 IEEE 34th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS). IEEE, pp. 74-83. https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2015.14

APA

Germanus, D., Ismail, H., & Suri, N. (2015). PASS: An Address Space Slicing Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation. In 2015 IEEE 34th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS) (pp. 74-83). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2015.14

Vancouver

Germanus D, Ismail H, Suri N. PASS: An Address Space Slicing Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation. In 2015 IEEE 34th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS). IEEE. 2015. p. 74-83 https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2015.14

Author

Germanus, D. ; Ismail, H. ; Suri, Neeraj. / PASS : An Address Space Slicing Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation. 2015 IEEE 34th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS). IEEE, 2015. pp. 74-83

Bibtex

@inproceedings{02c3e8d860c747d0b63eea4bd835827c,
title = "PASS: An Address Space Slicing Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation",
abstract = "The decentralized design of Peer-To-Peer (P2P) protocols inherently provides for fault tolerance to non-malicious faults. However, the base P2P scalability and decentralization requirements often result in design choices that negatively impact their robustness to varied security threats. A prominent vulnerability are Eclipse attacks that aim at information hiding and consequently perturb a P2P overlay's reliable service delivery. Divergent lookups constitute an advocated mitigation technique but are size-limited to overlay networks with tens of thousands of peers. In this work, building upon divergent lookups, we propose a novel and scalable P2P address space slicing strategy (PASS) to efficiently mitigate attacks in overlays that host hundreds of thousands of peers. Moreover, we integrate and evaluate diversely designed lookup variants to assess their network overhead and mitigation rates. The proposed PASS approach shows mitigation rates reaching up to 100%. {\textcopyright} 2015 IEEE.",
keywords = "Distributed Hash Table, Localized Eclipse Attack, Lookup, Mitigation, Peer-To-Peer Networks, Security, Distributed computer systems, Fault tolerance, Fault tolerant computer systems, Network security, Overlay networks, Telecommunication networks, Lookups, Peer to peer networks",
author = "D. Germanus and H. Ismail and Neeraj Suri",
year = "2015",
month = sep,
day = "28",
doi = "10.1109/SRDS.2015.14",
language = "English",
pages = "74--83",
booktitle = "2015 IEEE 34th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS)",
publisher = "IEEE",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - PASS

T2 - An Address Space Slicing Framework for P2P Eclipse Attack Mitigation

AU - Germanus, D.

AU - Ismail, H.

AU - Suri, Neeraj

PY - 2015/9/28

Y1 - 2015/9/28

N2 - The decentralized design of Peer-To-Peer (P2P) protocols inherently provides for fault tolerance to non-malicious faults. However, the base P2P scalability and decentralization requirements often result in design choices that negatively impact their robustness to varied security threats. A prominent vulnerability are Eclipse attacks that aim at information hiding and consequently perturb a P2P overlay's reliable service delivery. Divergent lookups constitute an advocated mitigation technique but are size-limited to overlay networks with tens of thousands of peers. In this work, building upon divergent lookups, we propose a novel and scalable P2P address space slicing strategy (PASS) to efficiently mitigate attacks in overlays that host hundreds of thousands of peers. Moreover, we integrate and evaluate diversely designed lookup variants to assess their network overhead and mitigation rates. The proposed PASS approach shows mitigation rates reaching up to 100%. © 2015 IEEE.

AB - The decentralized design of Peer-To-Peer (P2P) protocols inherently provides for fault tolerance to non-malicious faults. However, the base P2P scalability and decentralization requirements often result in design choices that negatively impact their robustness to varied security threats. A prominent vulnerability are Eclipse attacks that aim at information hiding and consequently perturb a P2P overlay's reliable service delivery. Divergent lookups constitute an advocated mitigation technique but are size-limited to overlay networks with tens of thousands of peers. In this work, building upon divergent lookups, we propose a novel and scalable P2P address space slicing strategy (PASS) to efficiently mitigate attacks in overlays that host hundreds of thousands of peers. Moreover, we integrate and evaluate diversely designed lookup variants to assess their network overhead and mitigation rates. The proposed PASS approach shows mitigation rates reaching up to 100%. © 2015 IEEE.

KW - Distributed Hash Table

KW - Localized Eclipse Attack

KW - Lookup

KW - Mitigation

KW - Peer-To-Peer Networks

KW - Security

KW - Distributed computer systems

KW - Fault tolerance

KW - Fault tolerant computer systems

KW - Network security

KW - Overlay networks

KW - Telecommunication networks

KW - Lookups

KW - Peer to peer networks

U2 - 10.1109/SRDS.2015.14

DO - 10.1109/SRDS.2015.14

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SP - 74

EP - 83

BT - 2015 IEEE 34th Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS)

PB - IEEE

ER -