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  • Effects of Bar Hours Regulation

    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Green, C. P. and Navarro Paniagua, M. (2016), Play Hard, Shirk Hard? The Effect of Bar Hours Regulation on Worker Absence. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 78: 248–264. doi: 10.1111/obes.12106 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/obes.12106/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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Play hard, shirk hard?: the effect of bar hours regulation on worker absence

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>04/2016
<mark>Journal</mark>Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Issue number2
Volume78
Number of pages17
Pages (from-to)248-264
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date23/06/15
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

The regulation of alcohol availability has the potential to influence worker productivity. This paper uses legislative changes in bar opening hours to provide a potential quasi-natural experiment of the effect of alcohol availability on working effort, focusing on worker absenteeism. We examine two recent policy changes, one in England/Wales and one in Spain that increased and decreased opening hours, respectively. We demonstrate a robust positive causal link between opening hours and absenteeism, although short-lived for Spain. The effect is long lasting for the UK where we provide evidence which suggests that increased alcohol consumption is a key mechanism.

Bibliographic note

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Green, C. P. and Navarro Paniagua, M. (2016), Play Hard, Shirk Hard? The Effect of Bar Hours Regulation on Worker Absence. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 78: 248–264. doi: 10.1111/obes.12106 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/obes.12106/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.