TY - JOUR

T1 - Policymakers' horizon and economic reforms

T2 - the protecionist effect of elections

AU - Conconi, Paola

AU - Facchini, Giovanni

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

PY - 2014/9

Y1 - 2014/9

N2 - This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two- and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two. This result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills. The protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats.

AB - This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two- and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two. This result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills. The protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats.

KW - Term length

KW - Election proximity

KW - Roll-call votes

KW - Trade liberalization

U2 - 10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.06.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.06.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 94

SP - 102

EP - 118

JO - Journal of International Economics

JF - Journal of International Economics

SN - 0022-1996

IS - 1

ER -