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    Rights statement: © 2014 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health. / Wilkinson, Stephen.
In: Bioethics, Vol. 29, No. 1, 01.2015, p. 26-35.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Wilkinson, S 2015, 'Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health', Bioethics, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 26-35. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12121

APA

Wilkinson, S. (2015). Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health. Bioethics, 29(1), 26-35. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12121

Vancouver

Wilkinson S. Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health. Bioethics. 2015 Jan;29(1):26-35. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12121

Author

Wilkinson, Stephen. / Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health. In: Bioethics. 2015 ; Vol. 29, No. 1. pp. 26-35.

Bibtex

@article{e71e4a2d2f804188be57a711cebf9181,
title = "Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health",
abstract = "One widely held view of prenatal screening (PNS) is that its foremost aim is, or should be, to enable reproductive choice; this is the Pure Choice view. The paper critiques this position by comparing it with an alternative: Public Health Pluralism. It is argued that there are good reasons to prefer the latter, including the following. (1) Public Health Pluralism does not, as is often supposed, render PNS more vulnerable to eugenics-objections. (2) The Pure Choice view, if followed through it its logical conclusions, may have unpalatable implications, such as extending choice well beyond health screening. (3) Any sensible version of Public Health Pluralism will be capable of taking on board the moral seriousness of abortion and will advocate, where practicable, alternative means of reducing the prevalence of disease and disability. (4) Public Health Pluralism is at least as well-equipped as the Pure Choice model to deal with autonomy consent issues.",
keywords = "Autonomy, Reproduction, Prenatal Screening, Public health",
author = "Stephen Wilkinson",
note = "{\textcopyright} 2014 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1111/bioe.12121",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "26--35",
journal = "Bioethics",
issn = "0269-9702",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health

AU - Wilkinson, Stephen

N1 - © 2014 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

PY - 2015/1

Y1 - 2015/1

N2 - One widely held view of prenatal screening (PNS) is that its foremost aim is, or should be, to enable reproductive choice; this is the Pure Choice view. The paper critiques this position by comparing it with an alternative: Public Health Pluralism. It is argued that there are good reasons to prefer the latter, including the following. (1) Public Health Pluralism does not, as is often supposed, render PNS more vulnerable to eugenics-objections. (2) The Pure Choice view, if followed through it its logical conclusions, may have unpalatable implications, such as extending choice well beyond health screening. (3) Any sensible version of Public Health Pluralism will be capable of taking on board the moral seriousness of abortion and will advocate, where practicable, alternative means of reducing the prevalence of disease and disability. (4) Public Health Pluralism is at least as well-equipped as the Pure Choice model to deal with autonomy consent issues.

AB - One widely held view of prenatal screening (PNS) is that its foremost aim is, or should be, to enable reproductive choice; this is the Pure Choice view. The paper critiques this position by comparing it with an alternative: Public Health Pluralism. It is argued that there are good reasons to prefer the latter, including the following. (1) Public Health Pluralism does not, as is often supposed, render PNS more vulnerable to eugenics-objections. (2) The Pure Choice view, if followed through it its logical conclusions, may have unpalatable implications, such as extending choice well beyond health screening. (3) Any sensible version of Public Health Pluralism will be capable of taking on board the moral seriousness of abortion and will advocate, where practicable, alternative means of reducing the prevalence of disease and disability. (4) Public Health Pluralism is at least as well-equipped as the Pure Choice model to deal with autonomy consent issues.

KW - Autonomy

KW - Reproduction

KW - Prenatal Screening

KW - Public health

U2 - 10.1111/bioe.12121

DO - 10.1111/bioe.12121

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 26

EP - 35

JO - Bioethics

JF - Bioethics

SN - 0269-9702

IS - 1

ER -