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Principals, agents, actors and research programmes.

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Principals, agents, actors and research programmes. / Shove, Elizabeth.
In: Science and Public Policy, Vol. 30, No. 5, 01.10.2003, p. 371-381.

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Shove E. Principals, agents, actors and research programmes. Science and Public Policy. 2003 Oct 1;30(5):371-381. doi: 10.3152/147154303781780308

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Shove, Elizabeth. / Principals, agents, actors and research programmes. In: Science and Public Policy. 2003 ; Vol. 30, No. 5. pp. 371-381.

Bibtex

@article{e0164767c9f846c7b766c1060a44bf9e,
title = "Principals, agents, actors and research programmes.",
abstract = "Research programmes appear to represent one of the more powerful instruments through which research funders (principals) steer and shape what researchers (agents) do. The fact that agents navigate between different sources and styles of programme funding and that they use programmes to their own ends is readily accommodated within principal–agent theory with the help of concepts such as shirking and defection. Taking a different route, I use three examples of research programming (by the UK, the European Union and the European Science Foundation) to argue that principal–agent theory cannot capture the cumulative and collective consequences of the relationships it seeks to describe.",
author = "Elizabeth Shove",
year = "2003",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.3152/147154303781780308",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "371--381",
journal = "Science and Public Policy",
issn = "0302-3427",
publisher = "Beech Tree Publishing",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Principals, agents, actors and research programmes.

AU - Shove, Elizabeth

PY - 2003/10/1

Y1 - 2003/10/1

N2 - Research programmes appear to represent one of the more powerful instruments through which research funders (principals) steer and shape what researchers (agents) do. The fact that agents navigate between different sources and styles of programme funding and that they use programmes to their own ends is readily accommodated within principal–agent theory with the help of concepts such as shirking and defection. Taking a different route, I use three examples of research programming (by the UK, the European Union and the European Science Foundation) to argue that principal–agent theory cannot capture the cumulative and collective consequences of the relationships it seeks to describe.

AB - Research programmes appear to represent one of the more powerful instruments through which research funders (principals) steer and shape what researchers (agents) do. The fact that agents navigate between different sources and styles of programme funding and that they use programmes to their own ends is readily accommodated within principal–agent theory with the help of concepts such as shirking and defection. Taking a different route, I use three examples of research programming (by the UK, the European Union and the European Science Foundation) to argue that principal–agent theory cannot capture the cumulative and collective consequences of the relationships it seeks to describe.

U2 - 10.3152/147154303781780308

DO - 10.3152/147154303781780308

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 371

EP - 381

JO - Science and Public Policy

JF - Science and Public Policy

SN - 0302-3427

IS - 5

ER -