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Principles of representation: why you can't represent the same concept twice

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Principles of representation : why you can't represent the same concept twice. / Connell, Louise; Lynott, Dermot.

In: Topics in Cognitive Science, Vol. 6, No. 3, 07.2014, p. 390-406.

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Connell, Louise ; Lynott, Dermot. / Principles of representation : why you can't represent the same concept twice. In: Topics in Cognitive Science. 2014 ; Vol. 6, No. 3. pp. 390-406.

Bibtex

@article{7d765b0ecd974f0db3c9e9bc3f4990c4,
title = "Principles of representation: why you can't represent the same concept twice",
abstract = "As embodied theories of cognition are increasingly formalized and tested, care must be taken to make informed assumptions regarding the nature of concepts and representations. In this study, we outline three reasons why one cannot, in effect, represent the same concept twice. First, online perception affects offline representation: Current representational content depends on how ongoing demands direct attention to modality-specific systems. Second, language is a fundamental facilitator of offline representation: Bootstrapping and shortcuts within the computationally cheaper linguistic system continuously modify representational content. Third, time itself is a source of representational change: As the content of underlying concepts shifts with the accumulation of direct and vicarious experience, so too does the content of representations that draw upon these concepts. We discuss the ramifications of these principles for research into both human and synthetic cognitive systems.",
keywords = "Embodied cognition, Concepts, Representation, Perceptual simulation, Language, Linguistic shortcut, Embodied cognition;Concepts;Representation;Perceptual simulation;Language;Linguistic shortcut;Linguistic bootstrapping",
author = "Louise Connell and Dermot Lynott",
year = "2014",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1111/tops.12097",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "390--406",
journal = "Topics in Cognitive Science",
issn = "1756-8757",
publisher = "Blackwell-Wiley",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Principles of representation

T2 - why you can't represent the same concept twice

AU - Connell, Louise

AU - Lynott, Dermot

PY - 2014/7

Y1 - 2014/7

N2 - As embodied theories of cognition are increasingly formalized and tested, care must be taken to make informed assumptions regarding the nature of concepts and representations. In this study, we outline three reasons why one cannot, in effect, represent the same concept twice. First, online perception affects offline representation: Current representational content depends on how ongoing demands direct attention to modality-specific systems. Second, language is a fundamental facilitator of offline representation: Bootstrapping and shortcuts within the computationally cheaper linguistic system continuously modify representational content. Third, time itself is a source of representational change: As the content of underlying concepts shifts with the accumulation of direct and vicarious experience, so too does the content of representations that draw upon these concepts. We discuss the ramifications of these principles for research into both human and synthetic cognitive systems.

AB - As embodied theories of cognition are increasingly formalized and tested, care must be taken to make informed assumptions regarding the nature of concepts and representations. In this study, we outline three reasons why one cannot, in effect, represent the same concept twice. First, online perception affects offline representation: Current representational content depends on how ongoing demands direct attention to modality-specific systems. Second, language is a fundamental facilitator of offline representation: Bootstrapping and shortcuts within the computationally cheaper linguistic system continuously modify representational content. Third, time itself is a source of representational change: As the content of underlying concepts shifts with the accumulation of direct and vicarious experience, so too does the content of representations that draw upon these concepts. We discuss the ramifications of these principles for research into both human and synthetic cognitive systems.

KW - Embodied cognition

KW - Concepts

KW - Representation

KW - Perceptual simulation

KW - Language

KW - Linguistic shortcut

KW - Embodied cognition;Concepts;Representation;Perceptual simulation;Language;Linguistic shortcut;Linguistic bootstrapping

U2 - 10.1111/tops.12097

DO - 10.1111/tops.12097

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 24895329

VL - 6

SP - 390

EP - 406

JO - Topics in Cognitive Science

JF - Topics in Cognitive Science

SN - 1756-8757

IS - 3

ER -