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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Rietzke, D. and Chen, Y. (2020), Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information. The RAND Journal of Economics. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12314 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1756-2171.12314 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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Push or Pull?: Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information. / Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu.
In: RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 51, No. 1, 20.03.2020, p. 301-317.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Rietzke, D & Chen, Y 2020, 'Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information', RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 301-317. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12314

APA

Rietzke, D., & Chen, Y. (2020). Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information. RAND Journal of Economics, 51(1), 301-317. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12314

Vancouver

Rietzke D, Chen Y. Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information. RAND Journal of Economics. 2020 Mar 20;51(1):301-317. Epub 2020 Mar 4. doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12314

Author

Rietzke, David ; Chen, Yu. / Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information. In: RAND Journal of Economics. 2020 ; Vol. 51, No. 1. pp. 301-317.

Bibtex

@article{0ea703c063b648919cf6ce3b97c1153a,
title = "Push or Pull?: Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information",
abstract = "We study a principal‐agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade‐offs between high‐ and low‐powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.",
keywords = "Pay for Performance, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, Observable Action, Principal-Agent Problem",
author = "David Rietzke and Yu Chen",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Rietzke, D. and Chen, Y. (2020), Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information. The RAND Journal of Economics. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12314 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1756-2171.12314 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.",
year = "2020",
month = mar,
day = "20",
doi = "10.1111/1756-2171.12314",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "301--317",
journal = "RAND Journal of Economics",
issn = "0741-6261",
publisher = "RAND",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Push or Pull?

T2 - Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

AU - Rietzke, David

AU - Chen, Yu

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Rietzke, D. and Chen, Y. (2020), Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information. The RAND Journal of Economics. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12314 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1756-2171.12314 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2020/3/20

Y1 - 2020/3/20

N2 - We study a principal‐agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade‐offs between high‐ and low‐powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.

AB - We study a principal‐agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade‐offs between high‐ and low‐powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.

KW - Pay for Performance

KW - Moral Hazard

KW - Adverse Selection

KW - Observable Action

KW - Principal-Agent Problem

U2 - 10.1111/1756-2171.12314

DO - 10.1111/1756-2171.12314

M3 - Journal article

VL - 51

SP - 301

EP - 317

JO - RAND Journal of Economics

JF - RAND Journal of Economics

SN - 0741-6261

IS - 1

ER -