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Reason explanation: a first-order normative account

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Reason explanation: a first-order normative account. / Manson, Neil C.
In: Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 7, No. 2, 05.2004, p. 113-130.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Manson NC. Reason explanation: a first-order normative account. Philosophical Explorations. 2004 May;7(2):113-130. doi: 10.1080/13869790410001694471

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Manson, Neil C. / Reason explanation : a first-order normative account. In: Philosophical Explorations. 2004 ; Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 113-130.

Bibtex

@article{b4b31ca27701440c8f253ae98a6d517a,
title = "Reason explanation: a first-order normative account",
abstract = "How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to why questions that assuage agents puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such an account of reason explanation, one that fully acknowledges the distinctive first-order first-person normative perspective of agency.",
keywords = "philosophy of mind, reason explanations, Davidson, Dancy, Bittner, agency",
author = "Manson, {Neil C.}",
note = "The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal of Philosophical Explorations, 7 (2), 2004, {\textcopyright} Taylor & Francis",
year = "2004",
month = may,
doi = "10.1080/13869790410001694471",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "113--130",
journal = "Philosophical Explorations",
issn = "1386-9795",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reason explanation

T2 - a first-order normative account

AU - Manson, Neil C.

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal of Philosophical Explorations, 7 (2), 2004, © Taylor & Francis

PY - 2004/5

Y1 - 2004/5

N2 - How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to why questions that assuage agents puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such an account of reason explanation, one that fully acknowledges the distinctive first-order first-person normative perspective of agency.

AB - How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to why questions that assuage agents puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such an account of reason explanation, one that fully acknowledges the distinctive first-order first-person normative perspective of agency.

KW - philosophy of mind

KW - reason explanations

KW - Davidson

KW - Dancy

KW - Bittner

KW - agency

U2 - 10.1080/13869790410001694471

DO - 10.1080/13869790410001694471

M3 - Journal article

VL - 7

SP - 113

EP - 130

JO - Philosophical Explorations

JF - Philosophical Explorations

SN - 1386-9795

IS - 2

ER -