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    Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10 (2), 2019, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2019 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the Social Psychological and Personality Science page: http://journals.sagepub.com/home/spp on SAGE Journals Online: http://journals.sagepub.com/

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Re-evaluating moral disgust: Sensitivity to many affective states predicts extremity in many evaluative judgments

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Re-evaluating moral disgust : Sensitivity to many affective states predicts extremity in many evaluative judgments. / Landy, Justin; Piazza, Jared Raymond.

In: Social Psychological and Personality Science, Vol. 10, No. 2, 01.03.2019, p. 211-219.

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Landy, Justin ; Piazza, Jared Raymond. / Re-evaluating moral disgust : Sensitivity to many affective states predicts extremity in many evaluative judgments. In: Social Psychological and Personality Science. 2019 ; Vol. 10, No. 2. pp. 211-219.

Bibtex

@article{b1071e26c25f4883b4cb0748fcbfb553,
title = "Re-evaluating moral disgust: Sensitivity to many affective states predicts extremity in many evaluative judgments",
abstract = "Disgust-sensitive individuals are particularly morally critical. Some theorists take this as evidence that disgust has a uniquely moral form: disgust contributes to moralization even of pathogen-free violations, and disgust{\textquoteright}s contribution to moralization is unique from other emotional states. We argue that the relationship between disgust sensitivity (DS) and moral judgment is not special in two respects. First, trait sensitivity to many other affective states, beyond disgust, predicts moral evaluations. Second, DS also predicts nonnormative evaluative judgments. Four studies supported these hypotheses, using multiple measures of DS, and judgments of moral violations (Studies 1 and 4), conventional violations (Study 1), imprudent actions (Study 1), competence (Study 2), and aesthetic evaluations (Study 3). Our findings call into question the usefulness of “moral disgust” as a psychological construct by showing that the relationship between DS and moral condemnation is one instantiation of a more general association between affect and judgment.",
keywords = "disgust sensitivity, emotion, moral judgment, aesthetic judgment, affect as information",
author = "Justin Landy and Piazza, {Jared Raymond}",
note = "The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10 (2), 2019, {\textcopyright} SAGE Publications Ltd, 2019 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the Social Psychological and Personality Science page: http://journals.sagepub.com/home/spp on SAGE Journals Online: http://journals.sagepub.com/ ",
year = "2019",
month = mar
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/1948550617736110",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
pages = "211--219",
journal = "Social Psychological and Personality Science",
issn = "1948-5506",
publisher = "Sage Periodicals Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Re-evaluating moral disgust

T2 - Sensitivity to many affective states predicts extremity in many evaluative judgments

AU - Landy, Justin

AU - Piazza, Jared Raymond

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10 (2), 2019, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2019 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the Social Psychological and Personality Science page: http://journals.sagepub.com/home/spp on SAGE Journals Online: http://journals.sagepub.com/

PY - 2019/3/1

Y1 - 2019/3/1

N2 - Disgust-sensitive individuals are particularly morally critical. Some theorists take this as evidence that disgust has a uniquely moral form: disgust contributes to moralization even of pathogen-free violations, and disgust’s contribution to moralization is unique from other emotional states. We argue that the relationship between disgust sensitivity (DS) and moral judgment is not special in two respects. First, trait sensitivity to many other affective states, beyond disgust, predicts moral evaluations. Second, DS also predicts nonnormative evaluative judgments. Four studies supported these hypotheses, using multiple measures of DS, and judgments of moral violations (Studies 1 and 4), conventional violations (Study 1), imprudent actions (Study 1), competence (Study 2), and aesthetic evaluations (Study 3). Our findings call into question the usefulness of “moral disgust” as a psychological construct by showing that the relationship between DS and moral condemnation is one instantiation of a more general association between affect and judgment.

AB - Disgust-sensitive individuals are particularly morally critical. Some theorists take this as evidence that disgust has a uniquely moral form: disgust contributes to moralization even of pathogen-free violations, and disgust’s contribution to moralization is unique from other emotional states. We argue that the relationship between disgust sensitivity (DS) and moral judgment is not special in two respects. First, trait sensitivity to many other affective states, beyond disgust, predicts moral evaluations. Second, DS also predicts nonnormative evaluative judgments. Four studies supported these hypotheses, using multiple measures of DS, and judgments of moral violations (Studies 1 and 4), conventional violations (Study 1), imprudent actions (Study 1), competence (Study 2), and aesthetic evaluations (Study 3). Our findings call into question the usefulness of “moral disgust” as a psychological construct by showing that the relationship between DS and moral condemnation is one instantiation of a more general association between affect and judgment.

KW - disgust sensitivity

KW - emotion

KW - moral judgment

KW - aesthetic judgment

KW - affect as information

U2 - 10.1177/1948550617736110

DO - 10.1177/1948550617736110

M3 - Journal article

VL - 10

SP - 211

EP - 219

JO - Social Psychological and Personality Science

JF - Social Psychological and Personality Science

SN - 1948-5506

IS - 2

ER -