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  • RoF MS3411-2 Manuscript-March25

    Rights statement: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Review of Finance following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta, Redouane Elkamhi, and Raunaq S. Pungaliya Reputation and Loan Contract Terms: The Role of Principal Customers Review of Finance 2016 20: 501-533. is available online at: http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/2/501

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Reputation and loan contract terms: the role of principal customers

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Reputation and loan contract terms: the role of principal customers. / Cen, Ling; Dasgupta, Sudipto; Elkamhi, Redouane et al.
In: Review of Finance, Vol. 20, No. 2, 03.2016, p. 501-533.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Cen, L, Dasgupta, S, Elkamhi, R & Pungaliya, RS 2016, 'Reputation and loan contract terms: the role of principal customers', Review of Finance, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 501-533. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfv014

APA

Cen, L., Dasgupta, S., Elkamhi, R., & Pungaliya, R. S. (2016). Reputation and loan contract terms: the role of principal customers. Review of Finance, 20(2), 501-533. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfv014

Vancouver

Cen L, Dasgupta S, Elkamhi R, Pungaliya RS. Reputation and loan contract terms: the role of principal customers. Review of Finance. 2016 Mar;20(2):501-533. Epub 2015 May 13. doi: 10.1093/rof/rfv014

Author

Cen, Ling ; Dasgupta, Sudipto ; Elkamhi, Redouane et al. / Reputation and loan contract terms : the role of principal customers. In: Review of Finance. 2016 ; Vol. 20, No. 2. pp. 501-533.

Bibtex

@article{b2a24dc8381648a288125891aab24610,
title = "Reputation and loan contract terms: the role of principal customers",
abstract = "Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other markets. We argue that one such consequence is smaller loan spreads and looser loan covenants on bank loans, as firms that are able to hold on to principal customers longer are perceived as safer firms by banks. We address causality and endogeneity issues via a variety of tests and find consistent results. Our study suggests that non-financial stakeholders can have important effects on the decisions of financial stakeholders.",
author = "Ling Cen and Sudipto Dasgupta and Redouane Elkamhi and Pungaliya, {Raunaq S.}",
note = "This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Review of Finance following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta, Redouane Elkamhi, and Raunaq S. Pungaliya Reputation and Loan Contract Terms: The Role of Principal Customers Review of Finance 2016 20: 501-533. is available online at: http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/2/501",
year = "2016",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1093/rof/rfv014",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "501--533",
journal = "Review of Finance",
issn = "1572-3097",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reputation and loan contract terms

T2 - the role of principal customers

AU - Cen, Ling

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

AU - Elkamhi, Redouane

AU - Pungaliya, Raunaq S.

N1 - This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Review of Finance following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta, Redouane Elkamhi, and Raunaq S. Pungaliya Reputation and Loan Contract Terms: The Role of Principal Customers Review of Finance 2016 20: 501-533. is available online at: http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/2/501

PY - 2016/3

Y1 - 2016/3

N2 - Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other markets. We argue that one such consequence is smaller loan spreads and looser loan covenants on bank loans, as firms that are able to hold on to principal customers longer are perceived as safer firms by banks. We address causality and endogeneity issues via a variety of tests and find consistent results. Our study suggests that non-financial stakeholders can have important effects on the decisions of financial stakeholders.

AB - Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other markets. We argue that one such consequence is smaller loan spreads and looser loan covenants on bank loans, as firms that are able to hold on to principal customers longer are perceived as safer firms by banks. We address causality and endogeneity issues via a variety of tests and find consistent results. Our study suggests that non-financial stakeholders can have important effects on the decisions of financial stakeholders.

U2 - 10.1093/rof/rfv014

DO - 10.1093/rof/rfv014

M3 - Journal article

VL - 20

SP - 501

EP - 533

JO - Review of Finance

JF - Review of Finance

SN - 1572-3097

IS - 2

ER -