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"Science", "sens commun" et preuve ADN: une controverse judiciaire a propos de la comprehension publique de la science ["Science" "Common Sense", and DNA evidence: a legal controversy about the public understanding of science]

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@article{7c49a819b7af4e2c9b7ad8cc4b3024d5,
title = "{"}Science{"}, {"}sens commun{"} et preuve ADN: une controverse judiciaire a propos de la comprehension publique de la science [{"}Science{"} {"}Common Sense{"}, and DNA evidence: a legal controversy about the public understanding of science]",
abstract = "This paper examines the English case, Regina v Adams in which the difference between {"}scientific reason{"} and {"}common sense{"} was explicitly at stake in the use of DNA evidence. In its decision the Appellate Court reinstated a boundary between {"}scientific{"} and {"}common sense{"} evidence, arguing that this boundary was necessary to preserve the jury's role as trier of fact. The paper's discussion of the court's work of demarcation addresses the unresolved problems with the place of probability estimates in jury trials.",
keywords = "Bayesian analysis, Boundary work, Criminal law, DNA Profiling, Probability",
author = "Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally",
year = "2005",
language = "French",
volume = "61",
pages = "655--681",
journal = "Droit et Societe",
issn = "0769-3362",
publisher = "Editions Juridiques Associees",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - "Science", "sens commun" et preuve ADN: une controverse judiciaire a propos de la comprehension publique de la science ["Science" "Common Sense", and DNA evidence: a legal controversy about the public understanding of science]

AU - Lynch, Michael

AU - McNally, Ruth

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - This paper examines the English case, Regina v Adams in which the difference between "scientific reason" and "common sense" was explicitly at stake in the use of DNA evidence. In its decision the Appellate Court reinstated a boundary between "scientific" and "common sense" evidence, arguing that this boundary was necessary to preserve the jury's role as trier of fact. The paper's discussion of the court's work of demarcation addresses the unresolved problems with the place of probability estimates in jury trials.

AB - This paper examines the English case, Regina v Adams in which the difference between "scientific reason" and "common sense" was explicitly at stake in the use of DNA evidence. In its decision the Appellate Court reinstated a boundary between "scientific" and "common sense" evidence, arguing that this boundary was necessary to preserve the jury's role as trier of fact. The paper's discussion of the court's work of demarcation addresses the unresolved problems with the place of probability estimates in jury trials.

KW - Bayesian analysis

KW - Boundary work

KW - Criminal law

KW - DNA Profiling

KW - Probability

M3 - Journal article

VL - 61

SP - 655

EP - 681

JO - Droit et Societe

JF - Droit et Societe

SN - 0769-3362

ER -