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Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks. / Heinrich, Markus; Vateva-Gurova, Tsvetoslava; Arul, Tolga et al.
In: Security and Communication Networks, Vol. 2019, 8348925, 14.07.2019.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Heinrich, M, Vateva-Gurova, T, Arul, T, Katzenbeisser, S, Suri, N, Birkholz, H, Fuchs, A, Krauß, C, Zhdanova, M, Kuzhiyelil, D, Tverdyshev, S & Schlehuber, C 2019, 'Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks.', Security and Communication Networks, vol. 2019, 8348925. https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/8348925

APA

Heinrich, M., Vateva-Gurova, T., Arul, T., Katzenbeisser, S., Suri, N., Birkholz, H., Fuchs, A., Krauß, C., Zhdanova, M., Kuzhiyelil, D., Tverdyshev, S., & Schlehuber, C. (2019). Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks. Security and Communication Networks, 2019, Article 8348925. https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/8348925

Vancouver

Heinrich M, Vateva-Gurova T, Arul T, Katzenbeisser S, Suri N, Birkholz H et al. Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks. Security and Communication Networks. 2019 Jul 14;2019:8348925. doi: 10.1155/2019/8348925

Author

Heinrich, Markus ; Vateva-Gurova, Tsvetoslava ; Arul, Tolga et al. / Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks. In: Security and Communication Networks. 2019 ; Vol. 2019.

Bibtex

@article{8d3e7579ecf540fc839466730e3c0bb7,
title = "Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks.",
abstract = "Securing a safety-critical system is a challenging task, because safety requirements have to be considered alongside security controls. We report on our experience to develop a security architecture for railway signalling systems starting from the bare safety-critical system that requires protection. We use a threat-based approach to determine security risk acceptance criteria and derive security requirements. We discuss the executed process and make suggestions for improvements. Based on the security requirements, we develop a security architecture. The architecture is based on a hardware platform that provides the resources required for safety as well as security applications and is able to run these applications of mixed-criticality (safety-critical applications and other applications run on the same device). To achieve this, we apply the MILS approach, a separation-based high-assurance security architecture to simplify the safety case and security case of our approach. We describe the assurance requirements of the separation kernel subcomponent, which represents the key component of the MILS architecture. We further discuss the security measures of our architecture that are included to protect the safety-critical application from cyberattacks.",
author = "Markus Heinrich and Tsvetoslava Vateva-Gurova and Tolga Arul and Stefan Katzenbeisser and Neeraj Suri and Henk Birkholz and Andreas Fuchs and Christoph Krau{\ss} and Maria Zhdanova and Don Kuzhiyelil and Sergey Tverdyshev and Christian Schlehuber",
year = "2019",
month = jul,
day = "14",
doi = "10.1155/2019/8348925",
language = "English",
volume = "2019",
journal = "Security and Communication Networks",
issn = "1939-0114",
publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Security Requirements Engineering in Safety-Critical Railway Signalling Networks.

AU - Heinrich, Markus

AU - Vateva-Gurova, Tsvetoslava

AU - Arul, Tolga

AU - Katzenbeisser, Stefan

AU - Suri, Neeraj

AU - Birkholz, Henk

AU - Fuchs, Andreas

AU - Krauß, Christoph

AU - Zhdanova, Maria

AU - Kuzhiyelil, Don

AU - Tverdyshev, Sergey

AU - Schlehuber, Christian

PY - 2019/7/14

Y1 - 2019/7/14

N2 - Securing a safety-critical system is a challenging task, because safety requirements have to be considered alongside security controls. We report on our experience to develop a security architecture for railway signalling systems starting from the bare safety-critical system that requires protection. We use a threat-based approach to determine security risk acceptance criteria and derive security requirements. We discuss the executed process and make suggestions for improvements. Based on the security requirements, we develop a security architecture. The architecture is based on a hardware platform that provides the resources required for safety as well as security applications and is able to run these applications of mixed-criticality (safety-critical applications and other applications run on the same device). To achieve this, we apply the MILS approach, a separation-based high-assurance security architecture to simplify the safety case and security case of our approach. We describe the assurance requirements of the separation kernel subcomponent, which represents the key component of the MILS architecture. We further discuss the security measures of our architecture that are included to protect the safety-critical application from cyberattacks.

AB - Securing a safety-critical system is a challenging task, because safety requirements have to be considered alongside security controls. We report on our experience to develop a security architecture for railway signalling systems starting from the bare safety-critical system that requires protection. We use a threat-based approach to determine security risk acceptance criteria and derive security requirements. We discuss the executed process and make suggestions for improvements. Based on the security requirements, we develop a security architecture. The architecture is based on a hardware platform that provides the resources required for safety as well as security applications and is able to run these applications of mixed-criticality (safety-critical applications and other applications run on the same device). To achieve this, we apply the MILS approach, a separation-based high-assurance security architecture to simplify the safety case and security case of our approach. We describe the assurance requirements of the separation kernel subcomponent, which represents the key component of the MILS architecture. We further discuss the security measures of our architecture that are included to protect the safety-critical application from cyberattacks.

U2 - 10.1155/2019/8348925

DO - 10.1155/2019/8348925

M3 - Journal article

VL - 2019

JO - Security and Communication Networks

JF - Security and Communication Networks

SN - 1939-0114

M1 - 8348925

ER -