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Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

<mark>Journal publication date</mark>07/2002
<mark>Journal</mark>Economics Letters
Issue number2
Number of pages6
Pages (from-to)239-244
Publication statusPublished
Original languageEnglish


We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning increases the observable asymmetries and affects bidding behavior. Firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively, in the absolute sense, in the afternoon. However, those who lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively, relative to their morning bids, than those who won in the morning.