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Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts. / De Silva, Dakshina G.; Dunne, Timothy; Kosmopoulou, Georgia.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 76, No. 2, 07.2002, p. 239-244.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

De Silva, DG, Dunne, T & Kosmopoulou, G 2002, 'Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts', Economics Letters, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 239-244. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00041-1

APA

De Silva, D. G., Dunne, T., & Kosmopoulou, G. (2002). Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts. Economics Letters, 76(2), 239-244. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00041-1

Vancouver

De Silva DG, Dunne T, Kosmopoulou G. Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts. Economics Letters. 2002 Jul;76(2):239-244. doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00041-1

Author

De Silva, Dakshina G. ; Dunne, Timothy ; Kosmopoulou, Georgia. / Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts. In: Economics Letters. 2002 ; Vol. 76, No. 2. pp. 239-244.

Bibtex

@article{bf770812094a4ec9a8412f407db552cc,
title = "Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts",
abstract = "We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning increases the observable asymmetries and affects bidding behavior. Firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively, in the absolute sense, in the afternoon. However, those who lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively, relative to their morning bids, than those who won in the morning.",
keywords = "Asymmetric auctions",
author = "{De Silva}, {Dakshina G.} and Timothy Dunne and Georgia Kosmopoulou",
year = "2002",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00041-1",
language = "English",
volume = "76",
pages = "239--244",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts

AU - De Silva, Dakshina G.

AU - Dunne, Timothy

AU - Kosmopoulou, Georgia

PY - 2002/7

Y1 - 2002/7

N2 - We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning increases the observable asymmetries and affects bidding behavior. Firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively, in the absolute sense, in the afternoon. However, those who lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively, relative to their morning bids, than those who won in the morning.

AB - We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning increases the observable asymmetries and affects bidding behavior. Firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively, in the absolute sense, in the afternoon. However, those who lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively, relative to their morning bids, than those who won in the morning.

KW - Asymmetric auctions

U2 - 10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00041-1

DO - 10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00041-1

M3 - Journal article

VL - 76

SP - 239

EP - 244

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 2

ER -