TY - JOUR

T1 - Stochastic Synergies in Sequential Auctions

AU - De Silva, Dakshina G.

AU - Jeitschko, Thomas D.

AU - Kosmopoulou, Georgia

PY - 2005/4

Y1 - 2005/4

N2 - We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the earlier auctions are more likely to participate in later auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.

AB - We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the earlier auctions are more likely to participate in later auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.

KW - Auctions

KW - Procurement

U2 - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.01.003

DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.01.003

M3 - Journal article

VL - 23

SP - 183

EP - 201

JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization

JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization

IS - 3-4

ER -