Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Stock repurchases and executive compensation co...

Electronic data

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Stock repurchases and executive compensation contract design: The role of earnings per share performance conditions

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>2011
<mark>Journal</mark>The Accounting Review
Issue number2
Volume86
Number of pages31
Pages (from-to)703-733
<mark>State</mark>Published
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We examine the link between firms’ stock repurchase activity and the presence of earnings per share (EPS) performance conditions in executive compensation contracts. Findings reveal a strong positive association between repurchases and EPS-contingent compensation arrangements. Further analysis suggests net benefits to shareholders from this association. Specifically, repurchasers experience larger increases in total payouts; the positive association between repurchases and cash performance is more pronounced for firms with EPS targets in the presence of surplus cash; undervalued firms with EPS targets are more likely to signal mispricing through a repurchase; and repurchasers with EPS conditions are associated with lower abnormal accruals. We find no evidence that EPS-driven repurchases impose costs on shareholders in the form of investment myopia.