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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 105, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

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Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Suspiciously timed trade disputes. / Conconi, Paola; DeRemer, David R.; Kirchsteiger, Georg et al.
In: Journal of International Economics, Vol. 105, 03.2017, p. 57-76.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Conconi, P, DeRemer, DR, Kirchsteiger, G, Trimarchi, L & Zanardi, M 2017, 'Suspiciously timed trade disputes', Journal of International Economics, vol. 105, pp. 57-76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

APA

Conconi, P., DeRemer, D. R., Kirchsteiger, G., Trimarchi, L., & Zanardi, M. (2017). Suspiciously timed trade disputes. Journal of International Economics, 105, 57-76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

Vancouver

Conconi P, DeRemer DR, Kirchsteiger G, Trimarchi L, Zanardi M. Suspiciously timed trade disputes. Journal of International Economics. 2017 Mar;105:57-76. Epub 2016 Dec 18. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

Author

Conconi, Paola ; DeRemer, David R. ; Kirchsteiger, Georg et al. / Suspiciously timed trade disputes. In: Journal of International Economics. 2017 ; Vol. 105. pp. 57-76.

Bibtex

@article{73b4e237de3848fbbfe114facb8aaadf,
title = "Suspiciously timed trade disputes",
abstract = "This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.",
keywords = "trade disputes, elections, reciprocity",
author = "Paola Conconi and DeRemer, {David R.} and Georg Kirchsteiger and Lorenzo Trimarchi and Maurizio Zanardi",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 105, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001",
year = "2017",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001",
language = "English",
volume = "105",
pages = "57--76",
journal = "Journal of International Economics",
issn = "0022-1996",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Suspiciously timed trade disputes

AU - Conconi, Paola

AU - DeRemer, David R.

AU - Kirchsteiger, Georg

AU - Trimarchi, Lorenzo

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 105, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

PY - 2017/3

Y1 - 2017/3

N2 - This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.

AB - This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.

KW - trade disputes

KW - elections

KW - reciprocity

U2 - 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 105

SP - 57

EP - 76

JO - Journal of International Economics

JF - Journal of International Economics

SN - 0022-1996

ER -