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Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations.

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Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations. / Donohue, William A.; Taylor, Paul J.
In: International Negotiation, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2003, p. 527-547.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Donohue, WA & Taylor, PJ 2003, 'Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations.', International Negotiation, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 527-547. https://doi.org/10.1163/1571806031310789

APA

Vancouver

Donohue WA, Taylor PJ. Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations. International Negotiation. 2003;8(3):527-547. doi: 10.1163/1571806031310789

Author

Donohue, William A. ; Taylor, Paul J. / Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations. In: International Negotiation. 2003 ; Vol. 8, No. 3. pp. 527-547.

Bibtex

@article{92f03c09ea7c4c6cae55c2ea86c3d00a,
title = "Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations.",
abstract = "This article examines the effects of role on terrorists{\textquoteright} use of power and affiliative strategies in negotiation as a function of terrorist ideology, incident type, and the outcome that is achieved. Data were scores on eight behavioral scales designed to reflect the dynamics of 186 terrorist negotiations, as reported in detailed chronological accounts. Results supported the hypothesized one-down effect with terrorists{\textquoteright} use of power-oriented strategies complemented by authority{\textquoteright}s use of affiliation-oriented strategies. The extent to which terrorists used aggressive strategies was related to the resolution of the incident, with attenuated outcomes more likely for those using more aggressive strategies. These dynamics differed across incident type, with aerial hijackings involving more overt power strategies than barricade-siege incidents, which were more likely to involve bargaining for certain outcomes. Finally, terrorist ideology and the associated identity concerns magnified the one-down effect, with religious fundamentalists engaging in more violence and less compromising strategies than terrorists with other ideological backgrounds.",
keywords = "role, one-down effect, power, affiliation, complementarity, terrorism, ideology.",
author = "Donohue, {William A.} and Taylor, {Paul J.}",
year = "2003",
doi = "10.1163/1571806031310789",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "527--547",
journal = "International Negotiation",
issn = "1382-340X",
publisher = "Brill",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations.

AU - Donohue, William A.

AU - Taylor, Paul J.

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - This article examines the effects of role on terrorists’ use of power and affiliative strategies in negotiation as a function of terrorist ideology, incident type, and the outcome that is achieved. Data were scores on eight behavioral scales designed to reflect the dynamics of 186 terrorist negotiations, as reported in detailed chronological accounts. Results supported the hypothesized one-down effect with terrorists’ use of power-oriented strategies complemented by authority’s use of affiliation-oriented strategies. The extent to which terrorists used aggressive strategies was related to the resolution of the incident, with attenuated outcomes more likely for those using more aggressive strategies. These dynamics differed across incident type, with aerial hijackings involving more overt power strategies than barricade-siege incidents, which were more likely to involve bargaining for certain outcomes. Finally, terrorist ideology and the associated identity concerns magnified the one-down effect, with religious fundamentalists engaging in more violence and less compromising strategies than terrorists with other ideological backgrounds.

AB - This article examines the effects of role on terrorists’ use of power and affiliative strategies in negotiation as a function of terrorist ideology, incident type, and the outcome that is achieved. Data were scores on eight behavioral scales designed to reflect the dynamics of 186 terrorist negotiations, as reported in detailed chronological accounts. Results supported the hypothesized one-down effect with terrorists’ use of power-oriented strategies complemented by authority’s use of affiliation-oriented strategies. The extent to which terrorists used aggressive strategies was related to the resolution of the incident, with attenuated outcomes more likely for those using more aggressive strategies. These dynamics differed across incident type, with aerial hijackings involving more overt power strategies than barricade-siege incidents, which were more likely to involve bargaining for certain outcomes. Finally, terrorist ideology and the associated identity concerns magnified the one-down effect, with religious fundamentalists engaging in more violence and less compromising strategies than terrorists with other ideological backgrounds.

KW - role

KW - one-down effect

KW - power

KW - affiliation

KW - complementarity

KW - terrorism

KW - ideology.

U2 - 10.1163/1571806031310789

DO - 10.1163/1571806031310789

M3 - Journal article

VL - 8

SP - 527

EP - 547

JO - International Negotiation

JF - International Negotiation

SN - 1382-340X

IS - 3

ER -