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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Pragmatics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Pragmatics, 101, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2016.06.007

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Textual factualization: the phenomenology of assertive reformulation and presupposition during a speech event

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1/08/2016
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Pragmatics
Volume101
Number of pages17
Pages (from-to)155-171
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date4/07/16
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

This work provides an operational framework to study the unfolding of new factual propositions out of originally suspended-factual (Narrog 2009, Tantucci 2015b) statements during a speech event. In particular, this model is centered on the dynamic relationship between cognitive control (i.e. Kan et al. 2013) and epistemic certainty. A speaker/writer’s epistemic inclination towards the factuality of a proposition P occurs throughout a text, either in the form of the assertive reformulation of an originally suspended-factual proposition P, or in the form of a presupposition trigger also turning P into a new factual statement. I refer to this phenomenon as textual factualization (TF) and I provide corpus data from the British National Corpus (BNC) to demonstrate it to be a frequent mechanism where an originally suspended-factual proposition [apparently P] is subsequently factualized both in written and spoken texts. I argue that TF instantiates as a form of interference/misinformation effect (cf. Ecker et al. 2015) as it triggers the qualitative alteration of an event memory by partially overwriting an original memory trace: from [apparently P] to [P]

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Pragmatics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Pragmatics, 101, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2016.06.007