In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying the approach suggested by S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell (1985, "The Potential: A New Approach to the Value in Multi-person Allocation Problems," Discussion Paper 1157, Harvard Institute for Economic Research) concerning the consistency property and the potential function. An axiomatic formulation of the values by this approach leads to two known values for coalition structure, namely, R. J. Aumann and J. H. Drèze's (1974, Int. J. Game Theory 3, 217-237) value (AD value) and G. Owen's (1977), "Values of Games with Priori Unions," in Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory (R. Heim and O. Moeschlin, Eds.), New York: Springer-Verlag) value for games with coalition structure. © 1992.