TY - JOUR

T1 - The effect of incentives on sabotage: The case of Spanish football

AU - del Corral, J

AU - Prieto-Rodriguez, J

AU - Simmons, R

PY - 2010/6

Y1 - 2010/6

N2 - A growing literature examines adverse behavior as unintended consequences of incentives. We test Lazear’s hypothesis that states that if rewards were dependent solely on relative performance then an increase in rewards would induce agents to engage in sabotage activity to reduce rivals’ output. We test this hypothesis using the natural experiment of a rule change in Spanish football, the increase in points for winning a league match from two to three. We find, consistent with Lazear’s hypothesis, that teams in a winning position were more likely to commit offences punishable by dismissal of a player after this change.

AB - A growing literature examines adverse behavior as unintended consequences of incentives. We test Lazear’s hypothesis that states that if rewards were dependent solely on relative performance then an increase in rewards would induce agents to engage in sabotage activity to reduce rivals’ output. We test this hypothesis using the natural experiment of a rule change in Spanish football, the increase in points for winning a league match from two to three. We find, consistent with Lazear’s hypothesis, that teams in a winning position were more likely to commit offences punishable by dismissal of a player after this change.

KW - incentives

KW - sabotage

KW - rules

KW - red cards

KW - football

U2 - 10.1177/1527002509340666

DO - 10.1177/1527002509340666

M3 - Journal article

VL - 11

SP - 243

EP - 260

JO - Journal of Sports Economics

JF - Journal of Sports Economics

SN - 1527-0025

IS - 3

ER -