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The EU's independent agencies: institutionalising responsible European governance?

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The EU's independent agencies: institutionalising responsible European governance? / Williams, G. D.
In: Political Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1, 01.03.2005, p. 82-99.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Williams, GD 2005, 'The EU's independent agencies: institutionalising responsible European governance?', Political Studies, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 82-99. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00518.x

APA

Williams, G. D. (2005). The EU's independent agencies: institutionalising responsible European governance? Political Studies, 53(1), 82-99. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00518.x

Vancouver

Williams GD. The EU's independent agencies: institutionalising responsible European governance? Political Studies. 2005 Mar 1;53(1):82-99. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00518.x

Author

Williams, G. D. / The EU's independent agencies: institutionalising responsible European governance?. In: Political Studies. 2005 ; Vol. 53, No. 1. pp. 82-99.

Bibtex

@article{5551c545563044ed978787547bb2858a,
title = "The EU's independent agencies: institutionalising responsible European governance?",
abstract = "This paper examines the creation of independent agencies within the EU, such as the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Majone and others have argued the case for European regulatory agencies. Such agencies can provide for continuity, expertise, accountability and effective authority – in short, an institutionalisation of responsibility. Against this optimism, I argue that a dilemma of institutional design naturally arises from the agencies{\textquoteright} situation in the EU. On the one side, we risk creating powerful agencies that institutionalise monomania– that is, agencies that single-mindedly and all-too-effectively pursue narrow agendas, inadequately checked by other bodies. On the other, we are also likely to encounter relatively impotent agencies which institutionalise schizophrenia– that is, agencies that must scout around for audience and support, and hence are unable to act effectively",
author = "Williams, {G. D.}",
note = "RAE_import_type : Journal article RAE_uoa_type : Philosophy",
year = "2005",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00518.x",
language = "English",
volume = "53",
pages = "82--99",
journal = "Political Studies",
issn = "1467-9248",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The EU's independent agencies: institutionalising responsible European governance?

AU - Williams, G. D.

N1 - RAE_import_type : Journal article RAE_uoa_type : Philosophy

PY - 2005/3/1

Y1 - 2005/3/1

N2 - This paper examines the creation of independent agencies within the EU, such as the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Majone and others have argued the case for European regulatory agencies. Such agencies can provide for continuity, expertise, accountability and effective authority – in short, an institutionalisation of responsibility. Against this optimism, I argue that a dilemma of institutional design naturally arises from the agencies’ situation in the EU. On the one side, we risk creating powerful agencies that institutionalise monomania– that is, agencies that single-mindedly and all-too-effectively pursue narrow agendas, inadequately checked by other bodies. On the other, we are also likely to encounter relatively impotent agencies which institutionalise schizophrenia– that is, agencies that must scout around for audience and support, and hence are unable to act effectively

AB - This paper examines the creation of independent agencies within the EU, such as the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Majone and others have argued the case for European regulatory agencies. Such agencies can provide for continuity, expertise, accountability and effective authority – in short, an institutionalisation of responsibility. Against this optimism, I argue that a dilemma of institutional design naturally arises from the agencies’ situation in the EU. On the one side, we risk creating powerful agencies that institutionalise monomania– that is, agencies that single-mindedly and all-too-effectively pursue narrow agendas, inadequately checked by other bodies. On the other, we are also likely to encounter relatively impotent agencies which institutionalise schizophrenia– that is, agencies that must scout around for audience and support, and hence are unable to act effectively

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00518.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00518.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 53

SP - 82

EP - 99

JO - Political Studies

JF - Political Studies

SN - 1467-9248

IS - 1

ER -