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The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models

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The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models. / Nobay, A.R.; Peel, David.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1982, p. 221-227.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Nobay, AR & Peel, D 1982, 'The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models', Economics Letters, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 221-227. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90155-0

APA

Nobay, A. R., & Peel, D. (1982). The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models. Economics Letters, 9(3), 221-227. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90155-0

Vancouver

Nobay AR, Peel D. The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models. Economics Letters. 1982;9(3):221-227. doi: 10.1016/0165-1765(82)90155-0

Author

Nobay, A.R. ; Peel, David. / The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models. In: Economics Letters. 1982 ; Vol. 9, No. 3. pp. 221-227.

Bibtex

@article{d4a02558dbb24e02b8150aad5757b3ec,
title = "The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models",
abstract = "Models with rationalexpectations typically include state variables whose values are controlled by the government. Hence, the need to specify behavioural rules for the authorities. Our purpose is to show, in the context of a well-known Cagan type model of the demand for money, that the assumption of rationalexpectations imposes the hitherto neglected requirement of rationality of the postulated behaviour of government. In particular the occurance of non-unique solutions highlights the need for a rational choice between these on grounds other than mathematical convenience or ad hoc economic assumptions of minimum variance, terminal conditions etc.",
author = "A.R. Nobay and David Peel",
year = "1982",
doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(82)90155-0",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "221--227",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models

AU - Nobay, A.R.

AU - Peel, David

PY - 1982

Y1 - 1982

N2 - Models with rationalexpectations typically include state variables whose values are controlled by the government. Hence, the need to specify behavioural rules for the authorities. Our purpose is to show, in the context of a well-known Cagan type model of the demand for money, that the assumption of rationalexpectations imposes the hitherto neglected requirement of rationality of the postulated behaviour of government. In particular the occurance of non-unique solutions highlights the need for a rational choice between these on grounds other than mathematical convenience or ad hoc economic assumptions of minimum variance, terminal conditions etc.

AB - Models with rationalexpectations typically include state variables whose values are controlled by the government. Hence, the need to specify behavioural rules for the authorities. Our purpose is to show, in the context of a well-known Cagan type model of the demand for money, that the assumption of rationalexpectations imposes the hitherto neglected requirement of rationality of the postulated behaviour of government. In particular the occurance of non-unique solutions highlights the need for a rational choice between these on grounds other than mathematical convenience or ad hoc economic assumptions of minimum variance, terminal conditions etc.

U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(82)90155-0

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(82)90155-0

M3 - Journal article

VL - 9

SP - 221

EP - 227

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -