Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > The political economy of trade and migration

Electronic data

  • ECPO-18-085_revised

    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Conconi, P, Facchini, G, Steinhardt, MF, Zanardi, M. The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress. Econ Polit. 2020; 32: 250– 278. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecpo.12149 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

    Accepted author manuscript, 364 KB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY-NC: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
  • Paola Conconi
  • Giovanni Facchini
  • Max Steinhardt
  • Maurizio Zanardi
Close
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1/07/2020
<mark>Journal</mark>Economics & Politics
Issue number2
Volume32
Number of pages29
Pages (from-to)250-278
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date11/11/19
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled-labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low-skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high-skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.

Bibliographic note

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Conconi, P, Facchini, G, Steinhardt, MF, Zanardi, M. The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress. Econ Polit. 2020; 32: 250– 278. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecpo.12149 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.