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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Conconi, P, Facchini, G, Steinhardt, MF, Zanardi, M. The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress. Econ Polit. 2020; 32: 250– 278. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecpo.12149 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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The political economy of trade and migration : Evidence from the U.S. Congress. / Conconi, Paola; Facchini, Giovanni; Steinhardt, Max; Zanardi, Maurizio.

In: Economics & Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2, 01.07.2020, p. 250-278.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Conconi, P, Facchini, G, Steinhardt, M & Zanardi, M 2020, 'The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress', Economics & Politics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 250-278. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149

APA

Conconi, P., Facchini, G., Steinhardt, M., & Zanardi, M. (2020). The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress. Economics & Politics, 32(2), 250-278. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149

Vancouver

Conconi P, Facchini G, Steinhardt M, Zanardi M. The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress. Economics & Politics. 2020 Jul 1;32(2):250-278. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149

Author

Conconi, Paola ; Facchini, Giovanni ; Steinhardt, Max ; Zanardi, Maurizio. / The political economy of trade and migration : Evidence from the U.S. Congress. In: Economics & Politics. 2020 ; Vol. 32, No. 2. pp. 250-278.

Bibtex

@article{ac0d2d99b19843539e6cc5323f4d3801,
title = "The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress",
abstract = "We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled-labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low-skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high-skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.",
keywords = "trade reforms, immigration reforms, roll-call votes",
author = "Paola Conconi and Giovanni Facchini and Max Steinhardt and Maurizio Zanardi",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Conconi, P, Facchini, G, Steinhardt, MF, Zanardi, M. The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress. Econ Polit. 2020; 32: 250– 278. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecpo.12149 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving. ",
year = "2020",
month = jul
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/ecpo.12149",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "250--278",
journal = "Economics & Politics",
issn = "1468-0343",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The political economy of trade and migration

T2 - Evidence from the U.S. Congress

AU - Conconi, Paola

AU - Facchini, Giovanni

AU - Steinhardt, Max

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Conconi, P, Facchini, G, Steinhardt, MF, Zanardi, M. The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress. Econ Polit. 2020; 32: 250– 278. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12149 which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecpo.12149 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2020/7/1

Y1 - 2020/7/1

N2 - We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled-labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low-skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high-skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.

AB - We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled-labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low-skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high-skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.

KW - trade reforms

KW - immigration reforms

KW - roll-call votes

U2 - 10.1111/ecpo.12149

DO - 10.1111/ecpo.12149

M3 - Journal article

VL - 32

SP - 250

EP - 278

JO - Economics & Politics

JF - Economics & Politics

SN - 1468-0343

IS - 2

ER -