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  • Enforcement actions JFI R1 20 OCT

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Financial Intermediation. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, 35, Part A, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003

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The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions

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The real effects of banking supervision : evidence from enforcement actions . / Danisewicz, Piotr Jan; McGowan, Danny; Onali, Enrico; Schaeck, Klaus.

In: Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 35, No. Part A, 07.2018, p. 86-101.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Danisewicz, PJ, McGowan, D, Onali, E & Schaeck, K 2018, 'The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions ', Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 35, no. Part A, pp. 86-101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003

APA

Vancouver

Author

Danisewicz, Piotr Jan ; McGowan, Danny ; Onali, Enrico ; Schaeck, Klaus. / The real effects of banking supervision : evidence from enforcement actions . In: Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2018 ; Vol. 35, No. Part A. pp. 86-101.

Bibtex

@article{5fa8ec924e6a47de8e7751513c026b63,
title = "The real effects of banking supervision: evidence from enforcement actions ",
abstract = "We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors{\textquoteright} enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.",
keywords = "Macro-financial linkages, Real effects, Economic growth, Supervision, Enforcement actions",
author = "Danisewicz, {Piotr Jan} and Danny McGowan and Enrico Onali and Klaus Schaeck",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Financial Intermediation. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, 35, Part A, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003",
year = "2018",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "86--101",
journal = "Journal of Financial Intermediation",
issn = "1042-9573",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "Part A",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The real effects of banking supervision

T2 - evidence from enforcement actions

AU - Danisewicz, Piotr Jan

AU - McGowan, Danny

AU - Onali, Enrico

AU - Schaeck, Klaus

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Financial Intermediation. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, 35, Part A, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003

PY - 2018/7

Y1 - 2018/7

N2 - We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.

AB - We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.

KW - Macro-financial linkages

KW - Real effects

KW - Economic growth

KW - Supervision

KW - Enforcement actions

U2 - 10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003

DO - 10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003

M3 - Journal article

VL - 35

SP - 86

EP - 101

JO - Journal of Financial Intermediation

JF - Journal of Financial Intermediation

SN - 1042-9573

IS - Part A

ER -