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The rise of national regulatory autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime

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The rise of national regulatory autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime. / Du, Ming.
In: Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 14, No. 3, 09.2011, p. 639-675.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Du, M 2011, 'The rise of national regulatory autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime', Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 639-675. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgr029

APA

Vancouver

Du M. The rise of national regulatory autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime. Journal of International Economic Law. 2011 Sept;14(3):639-675. doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgr029

Author

Du, Ming. / The rise of national regulatory autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime. In: Journal of International Economic Law. 2011 ; Vol. 14, No. 3. pp. 639-675.

Bibtex

@article{b0d557fdc4024647966599f87efa6efd,
title = "The rise of national regulatory autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime",
abstract = "This article sets forth two arguments. First, to respect a WTO Member's national regulatory autonomy in the world trading system is essential to ensure the WTO's long term success in light of the WTO's institutional constraints, the WTO's underlying philosophy and the WTO's nature as an incomplete contract. Second, and contrary to many popular criticisms against the WTO's allegedly intrusive penetration to national regulatory autonomy, this article argues that these critics have failed to appreciate the recent WTO case law developments. Indeed, the recent WTO case law has shown that the WTO Appellate Body has quietly fine-tuned its previous jurisprudence and as a result, WTO Members enjoy a broader scope of regulatory autonomy than conventionally assumed.",
author = "Ming Du",
year = "2011",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1093/jiel/jgr029",
language = "English",
volume = "14",
pages = "639--675",
journal = "Journal of International Economic Law",
issn = "1369-3034",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The rise of national regulatory autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime

AU - Du, Ming

PY - 2011/9

Y1 - 2011/9

N2 - This article sets forth two arguments. First, to respect a WTO Member's national regulatory autonomy in the world trading system is essential to ensure the WTO's long term success in light of the WTO's institutional constraints, the WTO's underlying philosophy and the WTO's nature as an incomplete contract. Second, and contrary to many popular criticisms against the WTO's allegedly intrusive penetration to national regulatory autonomy, this article argues that these critics have failed to appreciate the recent WTO case law developments. Indeed, the recent WTO case law has shown that the WTO Appellate Body has quietly fine-tuned its previous jurisprudence and as a result, WTO Members enjoy a broader scope of regulatory autonomy than conventionally assumed.

AB - This article sets forth two arguments. First, to respect a WTO Member's national regulatory autonomy in the world trading system is essential to ensure the WTO's long term success in light of the WTO's institutional constraints, the WTO's underlying philosophy and the WTO's nature as an incomplete contract. Second, and contrary to many popular criticisms against the WTO's allegedly intrusive penetration to national regulatory autonomy, this article argues that these critics have failed to appreciate the recent WTO case law developments. Indeed, the recent WTO case law has shown that the WTO Appellate Body has quietly fine-tuned its previous jurisprudence and as a result, WTO Members enjoy a broader scope of regulatory autonomy than conventionally assumed.

U2 - 10.1093/jiel/jgr029

DO - 10.1093/jiel/jgr029

M3 - Journal article

VL - 14

SP - 639

EP - 675

JO - Journal of International Economic Law

JF - Journal of International Economic Law

SN - 1369-3034

IS - 3

ER -