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    Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, European Romantic Review, 25 (4), 2014, © Informa Plc

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The roots of romantic cognitivism: (post) Kantian intellectual intuition and the unity of creation and discovery

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The roots of romantic cognitivism: (post) Kantian intellectual intuition and the unity of creation and discovery. / Macleod, Christopher.
In: European Romantic Review, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2014, p. 403-422.

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Macleod C. The roots of romantic cognitivism: (post) Kantian intellectual intuition and the unity of creation and discovery. European Romantic Review. 2014;25(4):403-422. Epub 2014 Jul 21. doi: 10.1080/10509585.2014.921979

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@article{a6a13d0100894ab694de3afb4eb4168d,
title = "The roots of romantic cognitivism: (post) Kantian intellectual intuition and the unity of creation and discovery",
abstract = "During the romantic period, various authors expressed the belief that through creativity, we can directly access truth. To modern ears, this claim sounds strange. In this paper, I attempt to render the position comprehensible, and to show how it came to seem plausible to the romantics. I begin by offering examples of this position as found in the work of the British romantics. Each thinks that the deepest knowledge can only be gained by an act of creativity. I suggest the belief should be seen in the context of the post-Kantian embrace of “intellectual intuition.” Unresolved tensions in Kant's philosophy had encouraged a belief that creation and discovery were not distinct categories. The post-Kantians held that in certain cases of knowledge (for Fichte, knowledge of self and world; for Schelling, knowledge of the Absolute) the distinction between discovering a truth and creating that truth dissolves. In this context, the cognitive role assigned to acts of creativity is not without its own appeal.",
author = "Christopher Macleod",
note = "The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, European Romantic Review, 25 (4), 2014, {\textcopyright} Informa Plc Date of Acceptance: 09/12/2013",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1080/10509585.2014.921979",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
pages = "403--422",
journal = "European Romantic Review",
issn = "1050-9585",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The roots of romantic cognitivism

T2 - (post) Kantian intellectual intuition and the unity of creation and discovery

AU - Macleod, Christopher

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, European Romantic Review, 25 (4), 2014, © Informa Plc Date of Acceptance: 09/12/2013

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - During the romantic period, various authors expressed the belief that through creativity, we can directly access truth. To modern ears, this claim sounds strange. In this paper, I attempt to render the position comprehensible, and to show how it came to seem plausible to the romantics. I begin by offering examples of this position as found in the work of the British romantics. Each thinks that the deepest knowledge can only be gained by an act of creativity. I suggest the belief should be seen in the context of the post-Kantian embrace of “intellectual intuition.” Unresolved tensions in Kant's philosophy had encouraged a belief that creation and discovery were not distinct categories. The post-Kantians held that in certain cases of knowledge (for Fichte, knowledge of self and world; for Schelling, knowledge of the Absolute) the distinction between discovering a truth and creating that truth dissolves. In this context, the cognitive role assigned to acts of creativity is not without its own appeal.

AB - During the romantic period, various authors expressed the belief that through creativity, we can directly access truth. To modern ears, this claim sounds strange. In this paper, I attempt to render the position comprehensible, and to show how it came to seem plausible to the romantics. I begin by offering examples of this position as found in the work of the British romantics. Each thinks that the deepest knowledge can only be gained by an act of creativity. I suggest the belief should be seen in the context of the post-Kantian embrace of “intellectual intuition.” Unresolved tensions in Kant's philosophy had encouraged a belief that creation and discovery were not distinct categories. The post-Kantians held that in certain cases of knowledge (for Fichte, knowledge of self and world; for Schelling, knowledge of the Absolute) the distinction between discovering a truth and creating that truth dissolves. In this context, the cognitive role assigned to acts of creativity is not without its own appeal.

U2 - 10.1080/10509585.2014.921979

DO - 10.1080/10509585.2014.921979

M3 - Journal article

VL - 25

SP - 403

EP - 422

JO - European Romantic Review

JF - European Romantic Review

SN - 1050-9585

IS - 4

ER -