Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Williams, G. (2018), The Social Creation of Morality and Complicity in Collective Harms: A Kantian Account. J Appl Philos. . doi:10.1111/japp.12334 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12334/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The Social Creation of Morality and Complicity in Collective Harms
T2 - A Kantian Account
AU - Williams, Garrath David
N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Williams, G. (2018), The Social Creation of Morality and Complicity in Collective Harms: A Kantian Account. J Appl Philos. . doi:10.1111/japp.12334 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12334/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
PY - 2019/7/1
Y1 - 2019/7/1
N2 - This article considers the charge that citizens of developed societies are complicit in large‐scale harms, using climate destabilisation as its central example. It contends that we have yet to create a lived morality – a fabric of practices and institutions – that is adequate to our situation. As a result, we participate in systematic injustice, despite all good efforts and intentions. To make this case, the article draws on recent discussions of Kant's ethics and politics. Section 2 considers Tamar Schapiro's account of how otherwise decent actions can be corrupted by others’ betrayals, and hence fall into complicity. Section 3 turns to discussions by Christine Korsgaard and Lucy Allais, which highlight how people can be left without innocent choices if shared frameworks of interaction do not instantiate core ideals. Section 4 brings these ideas together in order to make sense of the charge of complicity in grave collective harms, and addresses some worries that the idea of unavoidable complicity may raise.
AB - This article considers the charge that citizens of developed societies are complicit in large‐scale harms, using climate destabilisation as its central example. It contends that we have yet to create a lived morality – a fabric of practices and institutions – that is adequate to our situation. As a result, we participate in systematic injustice, despite all good efforts and intentions. To make this case, the article draws on recent discussions of Kant's ethics and politics. Section 2 considers Tamar Schapiro's account of how otherwise decent actions can be corrupted by others’ betrayals, and hence fall into complicity. Section 3 turns to discussions by Christine Korsgaard and Lucy Allais, which highlight how people can be left without innocent choices if shared frameworks of interaction do not instantiate core ideals. Section 4 brings these ideas together in order to make sense of the charge of complicity in grave collective harms, and addresses some worries that the idea of unavoidable complicity may raise.
KW - Complicity
KW - Responsibility
KW - Injustice
KW - Climate change
KW - Kantian ethics
U2 - 10.1111/japp.12334
DO - 10.1111/japp.12334
M3 - Journal article
VL - 36
SP - 457
EP - 470
JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy
JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy
SN - 0264-3758
IS - 3
ER -