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The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence. / Conyon, Martin; Peck, S; Read, L; Sadler, G.

In: Long Range Planning, Vol. 33, No. 4, 08.2000, p. 478-503.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Conyon, M, Peck, S, Read, L & Sadler, G 2000, 'The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence', Long Range Planning, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 478-503. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-6301(00)00054-6

APA

Conyon, M., Peck, S., Read, L., & Sadler, G. (2000). The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence. Long Range Planning, 33(4), 478-503. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-6301(00)00054-6

Vancouver

Author

Conyon, Martin ; Peck, S ; Read, L ; Sadler, G. / The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence. In: Long Range Planning. 2000 ; Vol. 33, No. 4. pp. 478-503.

Bibtex

@article{6e27ffc900194050a3d8fa97801b710e,
title = "The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence",
abstract = "In this article we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for the 1997 fiscal year. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets); and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically {\textquoteleft}demanding{\textquoteright}. Finally, we show how the pay–performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs. We augment this data with rich interview data to show the complexity of CEO compensationcontracts and how they are set.",
author = "Martin Conyon and S Peck and L Read and G Sadler",
year = "2000",
month = aug
doi = "10.1016/S0024-6301(00)00054-6",
language = "English",
volume = "33",
pages = "478--503",
journal = "Long Range Planning",
issn = "0024-6301",
publisher = "ELSEVIER SCI LTD",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Structure of Executive Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - Peck, S

AU - Read, L

AU - Sadler, G

PY - 2000/8

Y1 - 2000/8

N2 - In this article we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for the 1997 fiscal year. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets); and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically ‘demanding’. Finally, we show how the pay–performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs. We augment this data with rich interview data to show the complexity of CEO compensationcontracts and how they are set.

AB - In this article we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for the 1997 fiscal year. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets); and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically ‘demanding’. Finally, we show how the pay–performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs. We augment this data with rich interview data to show the complexity of CEO compensationcontracts and how they are set.

U2 - 10.1016/S0024-6301(00)00054-6

DO - 10.1016/S0024-6301(00)00054-6

M3 - Journal article

VL - 33

SP - 478

EP - 503

JO - Long Range Planning

JF - Long Range Planning

SN - 0024-6301

IS - 4

ER -