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    Rights statement: This is a preprint, or manuscript version of an article that has been accepted for publication in Review of Economics and Statistics.

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The Tyranny of the Single Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Forthcoming

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The Tyranny of the Single Minded : Guns, Environment, and Abortion. / Bouton, Laurent; Conconi, Paola; Pino, Francisco; Zanardi, Maurizio.

In: The Review of Economics and Statistics, 30.08.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Bouton, L, Conconi, P, Pino, F & Zanardi, M 2019, 'The Tyranny of the Single Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion', The Review of Economics and Statistics.

APA

Bouton, L., Conconi, P., Pino, F., & Zanardi, M. (Accepted/In press). The Tyranny of the Single Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion. The Review of Economics and Statistics.

Vancouver

Bouton L, Conconi P, Pino F, Zanardi M. The Tyranny of the Single Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 2019 Aug 30.

Author

Bouton, Laurent ; Conconi, Paola ; Pino, Francisco ; Zanardi, Maurizio. / The Tyranny of the Single Minded : Guns, Environment, and Abortion. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics. 2019.

Bibtex

@article{ceb1cc0265ee448490dbaf07fa7980ff,
title = "The Tyranny of the Single Minded: Guns, Environment, and Abortion",
abstract = "We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which office and policy motivated politicians vote in favor or against regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians flip flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their terms, but in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities as they approach re-election. To assess the evidence, we study U.S. senators' votes on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with the model's predictions, we find that i) election proximity has a pro-gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators; these effects arise for senators who ii) are not retiring, iii) do not hold safe seats, and iv) represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate size. Also in line with our theory, election proximity does not affect votes on reproductive rights, due to the presence of single-issue minorities on both sides.",
keywords = "Electoral incentives, Environment, Gun control, Reproductive rights",
author = "Laurent Bouton and Paola Conconi and Francisco Pino and Maurizio Zanardi",
note = "This is a preprint, or manuscript version of an article that has been accepted for publication in Review of Economics and Statistics.",
year = "2019",
month = "8",
day = "30",
language = "English",
journal = "The Review of Economics and Statistics",
issn = "0034-6535",
publisher = "MIT Press Journals",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Tyranny of the Single Minded

T2 - Guns, Environment, and Abortion

AU - Bouton, Laurent

AU - Conconi, Paola

AU - Pino, Francisco

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

N1 - This is a preprint, or manuscript version of an article that has been accepted for publication in Review of Economics and Statistics.

PY - 2019/8/30

Y1 - 2019/8/30

N2 - We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which office and policy motivated politicians vote in favor or against regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians flip flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their terms, but in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities as they approach re-election. To assess the evidence, we study U.S. senators' votes on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with the model's predictions, we find that i) election proximity has a pro-gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators; these effects arise for senators who ii) are not retiring, iii) do not hold safe seats, and iv) represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate size. Also in line with our theory, election proximity does not affect votes on reproductive rights, due to the presence of single-issue minorities on both sides.

AB - We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which office and policy motivated politicians vote in favor or against regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians flip flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their terms, but in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities as they approach re-election. To assess the evidence, we study U.S. senators' votes on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with the model's predictions, we find that i) election proximity has a pro-gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators; these effects arise for senators who ii) are not retiring, iii) do not hold safe seats, and iv) represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate size. Also in line with our theory, election proximity does not affect votes on reproductive rights, due to the presence of single-issue minorities on both sides.

KW - Electoral incentives

KW - Environment

KW - Gun control

KW - Reproductive rights

M3 - Journal article

JO - The Review of Economics and Statistics

JF - The Review of Economics and Statistics

SN - 0034-6535

ER -