Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > The value of categorical polythetic diagnoses i...

Electronic data

  • BJPS-2019-314.R3_Proof_hi

    Rights statement: © The British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. Published by The University ofChicago Press for The British Society for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/714801

    Accepted author manuscript, 261 KB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY-NC: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

The value of categorical polythetic diagnoses in psychiatry

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>31/12/2022
<mark>Journal</mark>British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Issue number4
Volume74
Number of pages23
Pages (from-to)941-963
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

Some critics argue that the type of psychiatric diagnosis found in the DSM and ICD are superfluous and should be abandoned. These are known as categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses. To receive a categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnosis an individual need only exhibit some, rather than all, of the symptoms on the diagnostic criteria. Consequently, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses only associate an individual with a range of symptoms rather than specify which symptoms they have. Drawing upon Ronald Giere’s account of scientific models, I portray categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses as abstract models which guide the building of less abstract models. These models can specify which symptoms a particular individual has. Additionally, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses can guide investigation of symptoms towards difficult to spot symptoms, guide investigation towards changing symptoms and guide investigation towards how symptoms manifest. These important roles mean categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses should not be abandoned.

Bibliographic note

© The British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. Published by The University ofChicago Press for The British Society for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/714801