Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 142, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
AU - Matros, Alexander
AU - Possajenikov, Alex
N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 142, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
PY - 2016/5
Y1 - 2016/5
N2 - We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.
AB - We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.
KW - Common value
KW - Contests
KW - Auctions
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003
M3 - Journal article
VL - 142
SP - 74
EP - 77
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
ER -