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  • FinalAccepted_EconLett_Mar16

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 142, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

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Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. / Matros, Alexander; Possajenikov, Alex.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 142, 05.2016, p. 74-77.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Matros, A & Possajenikov, A 2016, 'Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting', Economics Letters, vol. 142, pp. 74-77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

APA

Matros, A., & Possajenikov, A. (2016). Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters, 142, 74-77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

Vancouver

Matros A, Possajenikov A. Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters. 2016 May;142:74-77. Epub 2016 Mar 11. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

Author

Matros, Alexander ; Possajenikov, Alex. / Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. In: Economics Letters. 2016 ; Vol. 142. pp. 74-77.

Bibtex

@article{667fa8271e8d4d5e8466b1430a3ff9ef,
title = "Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting",
abstract = "We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.",
keywords = "Common value, Contests, Auctions",
author = "Alexander Matros and Alex Possajenikov",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 142, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003",
year = "2016",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003",
language = "English",
volume = "142",
pages = "74--77",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Possajenikov, Alex

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 142, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

PY - 2016/5

Y1 - 2016/5

N2 - We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

AB - We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

KW - Common value

KW - Contests

KW - Auctions

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

M3 - Journal article

VL - 142

SP - 74

EP - 77

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

ER -