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Verantwortung, Rationalität und Urteil

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter

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Verantwortung, Rationalität und Urteil. / Williams, Garrath David.

Handbuch Verantwortung. ed. / Ludger Heidbrink; Claus Langbehn; Janina Loh. Wiesbaden : Springer Verlag, 2017. p. 365-393.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter

Harvard

Williams, GD 2017, Verantwortung, Rationalität und Urteil. in L Heidbrink, C Langbehn & J Loh (eds), Handbuch Verantwortung. Springer Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp. 365-393.

APA

Williams, G. D. (2017). Verantwortung, Rationalität und Urteil. In L. Heidbrink, C. Langbehn, & J. Loh (Eds.), Handbuch Verantwortung (pp. 365-393). Springer Verlag.

Vancouver

Williams GD. Verantwortung, Rationalität und Urteil. In Heidbrink L, Langbehn C, Loh J, editors, Handbuch Verantwortung. Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag. 2017. p. 365-393

Author

Williams, Garrath David. / Verantwortung, Rationalität und Urteil. Handbuch Verantwortung. editor / Ludger Heidbrink ; Claus Langbehn ; Janina Loh. Wiesbaden : Springer Verlag, 2017. pp. 365-393

Bibtex

@inbook{a7078558a7c44c0ba56f9446dc63d21f,
title = "Verantwortung, Rationalit{\"a}t und Urteil",
abstract = "This chapter examines the philosophical grounds for linking responsibility with capacities to reason and to judge in the light of moral considerations. It discusses five different accounts that connect responsibility and rationality, the work of: Susan Wolf, R Jay Wallace, the jointly authored work of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Angela M Smith, and Pamela Hieronymi. Through these authors{\textquoteright} contributions, the chapter argues that the notion of rational ability is central to understanding and justifying practices of responsibility. Although there has been clear progress in debates about this connection, however, understanding the notion of rational or moral ability still poses profound challenges. One reason for this is suggested: such abilities may have constitutive connections with practices of holding responsible and of taking responsibility – connections that have yet to be fully explored in the literature.",
keywords = "Ability , Morality, Reasons, Control, Taking responsibility, Accountability",
author = "Williams, {Garrath David}",
year = "2017",
month = apr
language = "German",
isbn = "9783658061098",
pages = "365--393",
editor = "Heidbrink, { Ludger} and Claus Langbehn and Janina Loh",
booktitle = "Handbuch Verantwortung",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Verantwortung, Rationalität und Urteil

AU - Williams, Garrath David

PY - 2017/4

Y1 - 2017/4

N2 - This chapter examines the philosophical grounds for linking responsibility with capacities to reason and to judge in the light of moral considerations. It discusses five different accounts that connect responsibility and rationality, the work of: Susan Wolf, R Jay Wallace, the jointly authored work of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Angela M Smith, and Pamela Hieronymi. Through these authors’ contributions, the chapter argues that the notion of rational ability is central to understanding and justifying practices of responsibility. Although there has been clear progress in debates about this connection, however, understanding the notion of rational or moral ability still poses profound challenges. One reason for this is suggested: such abilities may have constitutive connections with practices of holding responsible and of taking responsibility – connections that have yet to be fully explored in the literature.

AB - This chapter examines the philosophical grounds for linking responsibility with capacities to reason and to judge in the light of moral considerations. It discusses five different accounts that connect responsibility and rationality, the work of: Susan Wolf, R Jay Wallace, the jointly authored work of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Angela M Smith, and Pamela Hieronymi. Through these authors’ contributions, the chapter argues that the notion of rational ability is central to understanding and justifying practices of responsibility. Although there has been clear progress in debates about this connection, however, understanding the notion of rational or moral ability still poses profound challenges. One reason for this is suggested: such abilities may have constitutive connections with practices of holding responsible and of taking responsibility – connections that have yet to be fully explored in the literature.

KW - Ability

KW - Morality

KW - Reasons

KW - Control

KW - Taking responsibility

KW - Accountability

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9783658061098

SP - 365

EP - 393

BT - Handbuch Verantwortung

A2 - Heidbrink, Ludger

A2 - Langbehn, Claus

A2 - Loh, Janina

PB - Springer Verlag

CY - Wiesbaden

ER -